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Abstract
This research explores the functional relationship between financial structure and agent's
cost-reducing effort in the realm of public-private-partnership (PPP) contracting. I consider a
canonical contracting problem where incomplete financial provisions are used to govern the
execution of a project that involves uncertain cost. The existing literature shows that debt (as
opposed to external equity) is the better financing alternative in terms of effort induction. I
show, on the other hand, that internal equity (as opposed to debt) is the better financing
alternative for effort induction when the parties are allowed to achieve ex post Pareto
improvement through self-enforcement, renegotiation, and replacement. Under the
assumptions that the consumer surplus is always greater than the realized cost, and that the
social cost of public funds (the tax rate) is greater than the private agent's cost of capital, I
show that:
(1) Ex ante capital structure and control rights regime jointly determine the equilibrium game
form of the contract (the agent's effort level and the uncertainty of cost don't matter).
(2) The agent's optimal cost-reducing effort is determined by a hold-up factor and a self-
enforcement factor. The former is a strict disincentive to the agent's effort, whereas the
latter can be an incentive or a disincentive to the agent's effort depending on the capital
structure of the contract.
(3) For any given initial capital investment, the agent's optimal cost-reducing effort decreases
with the magnitude of debt.
(4) For any given initial capital investment, the agent's optimal cost-reducing effort increases
with the magnitude of a performance bond when the contract is one with no positive self-
enforcement effect.
The theoretical result is consistent with the conventional wisdom that internal equity and
performance bond generally enhance the agent's devotion to a PPP contractual relationship.
This research also contributes a (subjective) PPP contract valuation method that takes into
account the underlying agency problem.
Thesis Supervisors:
Professor Fred Moavenzadeh
James Mason Crafts Professor of Systems Engineering and Civil & Environmental
Engineering
Professor Gordon M. Kaufman
Morris A. Adleman Professor of Operations Research and Management
3

Acknowledgements
I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Fred Moavenzadeh, my advisor and committee chair,
who guided me and supported me throughout my seven years at MIT. Fred's insight, wide range
of knowledge and deep involvement in international development inspired me to explore an
interdisciplinary subject. He taught me to ground theoretical modeling on realistic problems. I
especially appreciate his kindness and patience. I would have never been able to complete this
thesis without his support.
I wish to thank Prof. Gordon Kaufman for supervising my thesis. Gordon delivered insightful
comments on my research even when under tight time constraints. I am especially grateful for his
continuous attention even when he was not in very good health. I am grateful to Professor Patrick
Jaillet for his kindness in supporting my interdisciplinary research program and his persistent
questioning that strengthened the mathematical rigor of this thesis. I also want to thank Gordon
and Patrick for spurring me to expand my knowledge of economic theory. I am grateful to Prof.
Massood Samii for continuously providing constructive feedback to my research and insightful
advice on my career development. I especially appreciate his warm encouragement throughout
my time at MIT.
Professor Nathaniel Osgood has always been a teacher, a mentor, and a friend to me. I am forever
indebted to him for his persistent help and care while at MIT. I especially appreciate the large
amount of time he devoted to correcting various versions of not-so-sensible proposals.! I learned
much about principle of stochastic simulation and Systems Dynamics while working with him on
the Singapore Water Project. I wish to thank Professor Jim Hines for teaching me system
dynamics (SD) and letting me TA his SD courses in my early years at MIT. The systematic SD
"thinking" I learned from him will serve me well throughout my career.
I am most grateful to Cynthia Stewart, Danielle Severino, Patricia Vargas, and Christine Liberty
for helping me in many different ways throughout my study at MIT. Their care and attention
made MIT a warm and genial place for me to grow. I am also grateful to Deepti Nijhawan of the
MIT India program for her help during my stay in Chennai, India. She gave me the opportunity to
apply my research to real world problems.
I am grateful to the Louis Berger Foundation and the Motorola Foundation. Their financial
support during the last two years of my PhD program was critical.
My friends in Boston have always been a source of joy, support and stimulations. I want to thank
Jhih-Wei Chu, Vincent Chang, Vic Tang, Yuan Xiao, Hung-Jen Wang, Charlie Lertpattarapong,
Chu Eu Ho, Charles Cheah, Andy Wang, Matthew Hsieh, I-Han Chen, Mo-Han Hsieh, Joe Hsueh,
I-Fan Lin, Pina Wu, Wen-Hua Kuo, Ta-Chiang Liu, Jenny Fan, and many other friends for
enriching my life in Cambridge.
I want to dedicate this thesis to my parents for their endless love and support, and their persistent
confidence in my ability to complete this journey. Even though I was far away from Taiwan, they
remained a source of energy that drove me forward. Finally, I want to express my deepest thank
to my wife Hung-Chi. Without her love and company, I would have never been able to achieve
whatever I have done and become whoever I am.
5
[blank]
6
Table of Contents
L ist of Figures..................................................................................................... . .. 8
L ist of T ables........................................................................................................ . 9
C hapter 1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 11
1.1 The Structure of a Typical PPP Project..............................................................11
1.2 PPP Financial Contract and Default..................................................................12
1.3 The Agent's Cost-reducing Investment Problem................................................. 13
1.4 Research Questions...................................................................................14
1.5 Research Framework.................................................................................15
Chapter 2 Literature Review.....................................................................................16
2.1 Agency Issues Underlying PPP Contracting...................................................... 16
2.2 Mechanism Design and Optimal PPP Contract.......................................................17
2.3 The Relationship Between Contracting and Renegotiation.......................................18
2.4 PPP Financial Contracting................................................................................20
Chapter 3 The Model of PPP Financial Contracting........................................................ 22
3-1 M odel Setup............................................................................................ 22
3-2 Full-recourse Debt Contract........................................................................ 25
3.2.1 Parties' Payoffs in the Four Scenario Outcomes.......................................26
3.2.2 The Break-even Costs That Separate the Four Scenarios.............................31
3.2.3 Financial Structure and Contract Type................................................. 33
3.2.4 Parties' Expected Payoffs with the Two Contract Types.............................33
3.2.5 Agent's Optimal Cost-reducing Effort................................................. 36
3.2.6 Financial Structure and Agent's Effort Incentive..................................... 37
3-3 Non-recourse Debt Contract........................................................................ 39
3.3.1 Parties' Payoffs in the Four Scenario Outcomes...................................... 39
3.3.2 The Break-even Costs That Separate the Four Scenarios............................ 45
3.3.3 Financial Structure and Contract Type.................................................47
3.3.4 Parties' Expected Payoffs with the Five Contract Types............................47
3.3.5 Agent's Optimal Cost-reducing Effort................................................. 55
3.3.6 Financial Structure and Agent's Effort Incentive........................................58
3-4 Numerical Example.................................................................................. 59
3.4.1 Full-recourse debt contract...............................................................59
3.4.2 Non-recourse debt contract..................................................................64
Chapter 4: Case Study: The Taiwan High-Speed Rail Project............................................. 78
4.1 The TH SR Project.......................................................................................78
4.2 The Analysis of the THSR Contract.............................................................. 81
Chapter 5 Summary and Future Research Directions........................................................ 83
5.1 R esearch Sum m ary.....................................................................................83
5.2 Future Research Directions........................................................................ 94
A ppendix ...................................................................................................... . . 96
R eference...................................................................................................... . . 98
7
List of Figures
Figure 3-1 The timeline of the Model............................................................22
Figure 3-2 The parties' decision rules under a given contract (IO,DO,RO,H)...............24
Figure 3-3 The parties' payoffs with a Type F-I contract....................................34
Figure 3-4 The parties' payoffs with a Type F-II contract.......................................35
Figure 3-5 The parties' payoffs with a Type N-I contract...............................................48
Figure 3-6 The parties' payoffs with a Type N-II contract..........................................50
Figure 3-7 The parties' payoffs with a Type N-III contract...................................51
Figure 3-8 The parties' payoffs with a Type N-IV contract...................................52
Figure 3-9 The parties' payoffs with a Type N-V contract....................................54
Figure 3-10 The agent's optimal effort with a F-I contract.........................................60
Figure 3-11 The agent's expected utility with a F-I contract...................................60
Figure 3-12 The government's expected utility with a F-I contract.............................61
Figure 3-13 The agent's optimal effort with a F-II contract.......................................62
Figure 3-14 The agent's expected utility with a F-II contract..........................................63
Figure 3-15 The government's expected utility with a F-II contract..................................63
Figure 3-16 The agent's optimal effort with a N-I contract.......................................65
Figure 3-17 The agent's expected utility with a N-I contract...................................66
Figure 3-18 The bank's expected utility with a N-I contract......................................66
Figure 3-19 The agent's optimal effort with a N-II contract.....................................67
Figure 3-20 The agent's expected utility with a N-II contract......................................68
Figure 3-21The bank's expected utility with a N-II contract...................................68
Figure 3-22 The agent's optimal effort with a N-III contract.....................................69
Figure 3-23 The agent's expected utility with a N-III contract.....................................70
Figure 3-24 The bank's expected utility with a N-III contract.....................................70
Figure 3-25 The government's expected utility with a N-Ill contract.........................71
Figure 3-26 The agent's optimal effort with a N-IV contract.....................................72
Figure 3-27 The agent's expected utility with a N-IV contract.................................73
Figure 3-28 The bank's expected utility with a N-IV contract.................................73
Figure 3-29 The government's expected utility with a N-IV contract.........................74
Figure 3-30 The agent's optimal effort with a N-V contract................................... 75
Figure 3-31 The agent's expected utility with a N-V contract.....................................76
Figure 3-32 The bank's expected utility with a N-V contract.....................................76
Figure 3-33 The government's expected utility with a N-V contract..............................77
8
List of Tables
Table 3-1 Accounting sheet for the "No-reinvestment" scenario in a full recourse debt
con tract.........................................................................................................2 6
Table 3-2 Accounting sheet for the "Self-enforcement" scenario in a full recourse debt
con tract .................. ..................... ................................................................ 2 7
Table 3-3 Accounting sheet for the "New Agent" scenario in a full recourse debt
co n tract.........................................................................................................2 8
Table 3-4 Accounting sheet for the "New Contract" scenario in a full recourse debt
con tract.........................................................................................................2 9
Table 3-5 Accounting sheet for the "No-reinvestment" scenario in a non-recourse debt
contract..................................................................................40
Table 3-6 Accounting sheet for the "Self-enforcement" scenario in a non-recourse debt
contract ................................................................................................... . . 4 1
Table 3-7 Accounting sheet for the "New Agent" scenario in a non-recourse debt
co n tract.........................................................................................................4 2
Table 3-8 Accounting sheet for the "New Contract" scenario in a non-recourse debt
contract.................................................................................................... . . 4 3
Table 4-1 The Planned and the Resulting Financing Sources of THSR............................81
9
[blank]
10
Chapter 1 Introduction
The negotiation of terms of financial contracts has long been one of the most critical elements in
the negotiation of public-private-partnership (PPP) contracts. Financial contracts specify revenue,
funding sources, contingent financial claims, control rights of the underlying assets and serve as a
risk-sharing mechanism. The existing PPP literature is strongly focused on (1) contract design
problems such as moral hazard and adverse selection, and (2) property rights allocation problems
that compare efficiencies of PPP contracts and traditional procurement contracts. The relationship
between financial contracts and the agent's incentive for cost-reducing efforts is limited explored
and our understanding of this issue remains unclear.
The objective of this research is to establish the functional relationship between financial
structure and agent's effort. Given that the agent's level of effort affects the project's risk profile
and in turn determines each party's payoff under the specified risk-sharing mechanism, this issue
is of critical importance. Through analysis of the agent's cost-reducing decision-making problem,
this research contributes a (subjective) contract valuation method that takes into account the
underlying agency problem.
In this section I present the basic structure of a typical PPP project, the major components of a
typical PPP financial contract, and the agent's cost-reducing decision-making problem under a
given PPP financial contract.
1.1 The Structure of a Typical PPP Project
A PPP project is a public project that is financed, developed and operated by a private entity
for a contracted period of time. A PPP project typically involves (1) a government who offers
the concession, (2) a joint venture consortium who funds an executive entity to develop and
operate the project, (3) financial institutions who provide debt funding to finance the project,
and (4) independent 3rd parties who audit the project and enforce the contract.
The joint venture consortium funds the executive entity in the form of equity and is therefore
the de farco owner of the project. Given the aligned interests between the joint venture
consortium and the executive entity, hereafter we will use an aggregate entity of "the agent"
to represent these two parties.
The basic structure of a typical PPP project is as follows:
(1) Agent Selection
A PPP project starts with an agent selection session in which each would-be agent submits
to the government a detailed proposal documenting the financial structure, technology
plans, and professional qualifications with respect to the desired concession. The
government reviews each proposal and awards the concession to the bidder who offers the
optimal proposal. The criteria for the selection of optimal proposal could be the length of
concession period, the amount of cost, the amount of equity, technology, or professional
qualification of the bidder depending on the characteristics of the project.
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After an agent is selected, the involving parties will negotiate a contract set that normally
comprises a technology contract and a financial contract. The technology contract
specifies the technology that will be implemented and the technical specifications that
should be met, while the financial contract specifies the magnitude of equity from the
joint venture consortium, the magnitude of debt from the bank, the regulated revenue
from the consumer to the agent after the project starts operating, the duration of the
concession, and other contingent provisions that should be followed upon contingencies.
After the contract is signed, a trust is normally set up in the debt-issuing bank to manage
the cash flow of the project. The trust serves as a mean for the parties to monitor the cash
flow and to enforce the financial contract.
(2) Development
In the development stage, as the agent incurs expenses from development costs, he
submits invoices to the trust for reimbursement from capital held in escrow. Interest
expenses incurred during the development period are normally capitalized, thus increasing
the debt outstanding to the banks. The private agent has the incentive to minimize the
length of the development period, not only to avoid the additional interest cost, but also to
generate revenue as early as possible.
(3) Operation and Transfer
During the operation period, all revenue generated from the project flows through the trust
and is used to service the liability. Residual revenues are paid to the agent in the form of
dividends. Depending on the maturity profile of the debt, the agent may receive dividends
across the entire operating period, or he may not be paid before debt is fully liquidated.
At the end of the concession period, the ownership of the project reverts back to the
government, and yields little or no salvage value to the agent. The contract for the
concession can also be renewed upon mutual agreement.
1.2 PPP Financial Contracting and Default
A PPP financial contract typically comprises the specifications of revenue, equity, debt,
contingent provisions, and the control rights regimes of the underlying asset. Note that even
though the revenue is under regulation, the contract cannot fully control the agent's revenue
in some specific types of project. For example, while utility contracts often specifies a lump
some revenue that the government would pay the agent for generating a certain amount of
electricity, in many toll road projects the contracts simply specify the toll fee and the agent's
profit is to a substantially degree determined by the demand elasticity of the consumers.
Debt and equity constitute the financial source of the investment for the project. While equity
financing can be raised through internal financing or external financing, debt is always
financed through 3 rd party financial institutions. The control rights of the underlying asset are
normally specified with the debt contract and can appear in the following two formats:
a. Full-recourse debt: When the agent defaults, the government pays off the debt and
assumes the control rights of the underlying asset.
12
b. Non-recourse debt: When the agent defaults, the bank forgoes the debt and assumes the
control rights of the underlying asset.
There exist two conditions for a PPP agent to default: (i) In the development stage, the agent
defaults if the development cost is greater than the initial capital investmenti, and (ii) in the
operation stage, the agent defaults if the profit generated from the project is insufficient to
service the debt.2
When default occurs, the entity that assumes the control rights of the underlying asset can
always hire a new agent to complete the project. Note that if the technology required to
develop the project involves proprietary technologies, then the new control right owner may
incur a high transfer cost for bringing in a new agent. In such cases, it will be at the new
control right owner's interest to renegotiate with the incumbent agent such that the two parties
can share the surplus generated from the cost to bring in a new agent.
When a project exhibits substantial risks of default, the bank may impose additional terms to
protect their loan. For example, the bank may either set an upper bound for cost, or require
that the present value of the project be above the debt value. If these conditions fail to hold,
the agent will be claimed to have defaulted the contract.
Contingent claims refer to financial clauses that are commonly used by the involving parties
to protect their interests in the event of default. Among all, a performance bond is a very
commonly used contingent claim in PPP contracting. A performance bond is a bond given to
the recipient against loss in case the term of the contract is not fulfilled. In the realm of PPP
contracting, the issuer of the bond is normally the agent, while the recipient of the bond is
often the government.
1.3 The Agent's Cost-reducing Investment problem
When a project exhibits cost uncertainty and, as a result, the probability of default exists, the
agent has to make his cost-reducing investment decision taking into account the possible
consequences of default. For a PPP contract, there exist three scenario outcomes that can
occur in the event of default:
(1) Self-enforcement: The agent decides to make up the capital shortfall with his own
capital and complete the project. Reinvestment is justified if the guaranteed revenue is
high, or if the agent is fear of losing the performance bond.
(2) New contract: the parties can renegotiate a new contract if they are mutually benefit
from maintaining the incumbent concessionship (probably due to a high transfer cost for
bringing in a new agent). The parties who agree on the new contract have to make up
the capital shortfall to complete the project. In other words, it can be the government, or
the agent, or the bank, or a combination of all the three of them to contribute the new
investment. Any new investment made by the bank and the agent has to be justified by a
The depletion of capital is not a necessary condition for default to occur. Since effort is not verifiable, default could
happen when funding is still sufficient but the agent expects an adverse outcome for the project (For example, the
Taiwan High Speed Rail project).
2 In this research our major concern is the defaulting in the development stage. The problem of defaulting in the
operation stage is not included in our analysis.
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positive net payoff. In some cases, the government compensates the agent's
reinvestment by extending the concession period.
(3) New agent: The control rights owner seizes the underlying asset and completes the
project with a new agent. This scenario happens in the full-recourse debt regime when
the magnitude of the performance bond is high, or when the new agent's cost is low. It
happens in the non-recourse debt regime when the guaranteed revenue is high, or when
the new agent's cost is low.
The possibility of default and the subsequent renegotiation naturally gives rise to a hold-up
concern. Hold-up refers to a condition in which an agent in a contractual relationship under-
invests with respect to the first best investment in the early stage if he foresees that he will not
be able to enjoy the payoff from his investment at a later stage. Hold-up applies only to
relationship-specific investments for such investments decrease the agent's credible threats of
no trade and in turn increases the counterpart's bargaining payoff (under the assumption that
the agent has no monopoly bargaining power).3
The agent's cost-reducing investment problem is as follows: Under a given financial contract,
the agent determines his cost-reducing effort to maximize his expected payoff (given his prior
probability judgments about uncertain costs) taking into account the play out of the above
three scenarios and the scenario of no default. It is clear that our focus must be on how
financial structure affects the hold-up effect. This decision analysis problem will be
formalized in chapter 3.
1.4 Research Questions
The objective of this research is to answer the following three questions:
(1) Whether or how the financial structure of a PPP contract determines the possible scenario
outcomes that can occur?
(2) Whether or how the financial structure of a PPP contract (including capital structure,
performance bond, and the control rights) affects the agent's optimal cost-reducing
investment decision?
(3) Whether or how the financial structure of a PPP contract (including both capital structure,
performance bond, and the control rights) affects the parties' expected payoff?
(4) Whether or how the technology involved in a PPP project affects the agent's optimal cost-
reducing investment decision and the parties' expected payoffs?
It will be shown in chapter 3 that when the agent's effort level is unverifiable, a formal model
using analytical approach can only address question (1) and (3). Question (2) must be addressed
with numerical methods.
3 It is generally known that when there exist relationship-specific investments, ex ante efficiency cannot be achieved
without a contract. When the contract has symmetric information, the involving parties can always construct a
revelation mechanism to achieve the first best investment when the have full commitment of no default.
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1.5 Research Framework
The framework of this research is as follows:
(1) Justification of analytical approach: I review the current literature on PPP contracting and
show specifically why analyzing default is the sensible way to establish the functional
relationship between financial structure and agent's effort incentive.
(2) Theoretical model: A theoretical model is developed to establish the functional
relationship between financial structure and the agent's effort incentive. The theoretical
model consists of two parts: the first part studies full-recourse debt contracts. The second
part studies non-recourse debt contracts.
(3) Numerical example: Given the cost uncertainty embedded in the model, it is not possible
to derive an analytical solution for the agent's optimal effort. As a result a numerical
example is used to demonstrate the financial structure's effect over the agent's optimal
effort and the participating parties' expected payoffs.
(4) Case Study: I relate my theoretical result to real world practice by examining the
performance of a particular PPP contract (The Taiwan High Speed Rail contract).
It is with no doubt that this research can at best address only a subset of the problems underlying
PPP financial contracting. I finalize this research by summarizing the research outcome and
proposing the directions for further researches.
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Chapter 2 Literature Review
This chapter presents a survey on PPP contracting literature. The disciplines most relevant to our
problem are regulatory economic and contract theory. I start by reviewing the mechanism design
literature on regulated contract design. I then review the literature on incomplete contract theory.
2.1 The Agency Issues underlying PPP Contracting
In the realm of PPP contracting, while the government can regulate the revenue, she cannot
directly control the cost. Cost overruns are common in public projects. Scherer (1964) reports that
the realized costs exceed the initial cost estimates by 220% on the average in the defense
procurement cases he studied. It is well recognized that the agency problem plays an important
role in determining the magnitude of a cost overrun.
One agency-related explanation for cost overruns is "lock-in": In a multi-stage long-term project
run by a series of short-term contracts, it may pay for the firm to sacrifice short-term profit in the
early stage in order to create a lock-in relationship with the government and derive rent in the
latter stage. According to Scherer (1964, p.156):
"Contractors commonly submit unrealistically low cost estimates. This practice may
require accepting a low realized rate of profit on development work, but contractors have
generally been willing to sacrifice initial development contracts profit for the chance of
earning substantial production follow-on contract profits once they are locked together
with the government in a relationship analogous to a bilateral monopoly."
Farrel and Shapiro (1989) analyze optimal contracting with a lock-in feature. They consider a
buyer who incurs a setup cost and a seller who chooses an unverifiable qualitative parameter as
the trading attribute. They show that when setup costs are observable, first best can be achieved
even though contracts cannot enforcably specify quality. When setup costs are unobservable, long
term price contracts outperform short-term contracts.
The lock-in phenomenon is termed "buying-in" when several firms are bidding in the first stage
of a project and the winner of the bid is likely to become the sole contractor in the following
stages. Marshall (1989), and Riordan and Sappington (1989) report that buying-in is especially
common in public procurements that involve multi-stage processes.
Hold-up is clearly another agency-related source of increased project costs. Croker and Reynold
(1989), Gilbert and Newbery (1988), and Salant and Woroch (1988. 1991) argue that a repetition
of relationship between the government and the agent as well as the relationship between the
government and other regulated agents may substitute for long term contracts and guarantee
appropriate investment. This argument is based on the assumption that the government's
reputation for not expropriating the agent's ex ante investment is critical for inducing social
optimal investment in new contracts.
Following this thread, Hart and Holmstrom (1987) propose a reputation model that determines
the extent of underinvestment as a function of the length of the relationship between a supplier
and a buyer. Lewis (1986) shows that when the government's net value for the project increases
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over time, the agent has less incentive to keep as a low-cost operator as the continuation of the
project is less in question.
Laffont and Tirole (1993) point out three other possible sources of cost overruns: The first comes
from order changes. This phenomenon only happens when technology adjustments occur and
involve more often upgrading than downgrading or simplification. Order changes do not cause
agency problems and are less a concern in economic theory. The second source comes from the
contract supervisor's encouragement of cost underestimation in order to get support from a
government or congress.
There is also a long tradition of regulated firms paying excessive prices to affiliated, unregulated
companies for various inputs, including investments (see Kahn 1970, vol I, pp.28-30). For
instance, the relationship between AT&T and its equipment supplier, Western Electric, which is
also its subsidiary, raised these concerns. Melumad (1990), and McAfee and McMillan (1990)
show that it is generally not possible to generate a socially optimal contract when the government
cannot measure the payment the agent makes to his subcontractors.
2.2 Mechanism Design and Optimal PPP Contract
Traditionally, the studies on optimal PPP contract design have been rooted in the theory of
mechanism design. Maskin and Moore (1999) state that the motivation of mechanism design is to
understand "Whether is it possible to design a game form (also call a mechanism) whose
equilibrium outcomes are assured of being optimal with respect to some given criterion of social
welfare?"
The seminal paper on mechanism design under adverse selection is Mirrlee (1971). While
Mirrlee's principal concern is optimal taxation, his theoretical framework has been carried over to
wide array of economic applications. The theory was further developed by Mussa and Rosen
(1978), Green and Laffont (1979), Baron and Myerson (1982), Guesnerie and Laffont (1984), and
Maskin and Reily (1984) to study contracting problems.
Loeb and Magat (1979) were the first paper to use mechanism design to examine a regulated
contract. They consider a special case in which there is no social cost for leaving rent to the agent.
They show that it suffices to award the agent the entire net consumer surplus to induce a first best
investment. This conclusion is, however, in conflict with the conventional wisdom that leaving
rent to the agent reduces social welfare. Sappington (1982) introduces the notion of social cost of
public funds to study regulated contract design. Baron and Myerson (1982) study the adverse
selection problem and show that the socially optimal price the agent is allowed to charge the
consumer exceeds its Ramsey level when the government cannot observe the agent's cost. Chiang
(2002) studies a multi-principal moral hazard problem and shows that the power of incentive for
a risk-averse agent decreases by n-fold when the number of principal increases from 1 to n.
Laffont and Tirole (1993) unify the moral hazard and the adverse selection problems in a single
model. They show that a socially optimal contract menu leads the agent to invest efficiently and
derive a positive rent, whereas the inefficient agent under-invests and derives no rent. In fact, the
ability of the efficient type agent to mimic the inefficient type agent forces the government to
give up rent to the efficient type agent if the government wishes to have an active inefficient type
agent.
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Mechanism design literature normally considers a linear payoff contract that comprises a fixed
payoff component and a performance-based payoff component. The linear contract can be
replicated with a combination of the two incentive schemes commonly used in regulated
contracts: price cap, and cost of services. The former scheme yields more power incentive,
whereas the latter scheme yields lower power incentive.
On empirical front, Mathios and Rogers (1989) look at prices of intrastate telephone services in
the United States and show that states that have adopted price-cap regulation have, on average,
lower rates than those that have stuck to cost-of-service regulation.
The selection of high-powered incentives schemes by defense contractors that have favorable
information is reported by Scherer (1964, p227), who writes:
"When contractors believe that cost targets will be tight (i.e. when there is a overrun bias,
they bargain successfully for low-sharing proportion and high price ceiling, while when
loose targets (i.e. an underrun bias) are expected, they accept a high share of overrun and
(more likely) underruns and relatively low price ceiling. Or when relatively high sharing
proportions are agreed upon in advance of cosr negotiations, contractors hold out for
pessimistic cost targets."
Scherer (1964) also documents that the high-power incentive schemes are correlated with better
performance types.
2.3 The Relationship between Contracting and Renegotiation
Mechanism design literature has so far developed many sophisticated mechanisms that ensure
Pareto equilibrium when a contract exhibits complete information. However, these finding can be
challenged for two reasons:
First, in the real world most contracts are far simpler than optimal contracts derived through
mechanism design. For this reason some researchers study the conditions under which the
optimal complex contracts can be simple contracts. Huberman and Kahn (1988), for example,
show that, given certain strategic concerns, an optimal complex contract can be replaced by a
simple contract with renegotiation at a later stage.
Second, when a mechanism is adopted, an agent is presumably interested in achieving Pareto
optimal outcome for each possible state of nature. However, in conditions where an out-of-
equilibrium phenomenon occurs, it may not be in the parties' best interests to stick to the original
contract when there exist efficient alternatives that they mutually prefer. It is then reasonable for
these agents to forgo the original contract and renegotiate to the Pareto outcome. Traditional
mechanism design literature normally assigns high penalties to out-of-equilibrium strategies as a
way to deter deviations, and in turn eliminate the possibility of renegotiation. This approach
essentially reduces social welfare since this class of contracts should satisfy additional
renegotiation-proof constraints.
It is then important to examine the issue of renegotiation. Chung (1991) and Aghion, Dewatripont,
and Rey (1994) argue that the ex post bargaining game can be designed at date 1. Consider, for
example, a trade that only involves seller's investment. The first best contract can be easily
achieved if the contract can endow the seller with all the bargaining power at date 2. However,
for such predetermined bargaining games to work, a higher degree of verifiability is needed, so
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that the court can enforce the ex post renegotiation. Schmitz (2001) argue that writing a null
contract and designing a renegotiation procedure is no different from writing a complete contract.
Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and More (1990) propose an incomplete contract theory to
study firm's integration problems. Contrary to traditional complete contract theory which places
emphasis on design of a mechanism that realizes Pareto equilibrium at each state of nature,
incomplete contract theory features a contract that specifies the control rights of certain assets,
with other performance-related terms being left incomplete. Given that the ex post trading
decision becomes contractible through renegotiation, ex post efficiency can be achieved. The
incomplete contract approach is then able to analyze agents' ex ante investment decisions since
these investment levels are determined by the incentive from the ex post payoff.
The incomplete contract approach proposed by Grossman and Hart (1986), and Hart and More
(1990) is appealing for several reasons: (1) Ex post efficiency can always be achieved and the
constraints that mechanism design theory imposes on ex post off-equilibrium outcomes can be
removed. (2) Incomplete contract theory has implications for the economics of control rights. (3)
The default option (though this outside alternative only serves as a threat point and will not
necessarily be exercised) provides a link between the market and the contract.
In reality, it is practical to argue that essentially all real world contracts are incomplete, given that
parties in the real world are often unable to specify a complete contingent plan to govern the
execution of the contract. However, the contract featured in the incomplete contract approach is
more incomplete (from traditional complete contract theorists' view) in the sense that parties'
decisions in this type of contract are not governed by a control mechanism, but rather they are
motivated by the ex post payoff from the renegotiation game (which normally lacks a directly
enforcing power ex ante).
Hart and Moore (1999) elaborate the rationale for parties to sign incomplete contracts. They
propose that when the number of the states is too large, it would be prohibitively expensive for
the involving parties to write a complete contract. As a result, the two parties would simply write
an incomplete contract. After the state of nature is realized, they will renegotiate the contract,
since by then they will know the realized state of nature and hence the right good to be delivered.
However, some researchers question the theoretical robustness of the incomplete contract
approach. One critical conclusion from the classical Hart and Moore's (1986) analysis points out
that a party's incentive to invest strengthens as his control over the production asset increases.
This result is derived by assuming that agents renegotiate following the Nash bargaining rule.
DeMeza and Lockwood (1998) and Chiu (1998), however, point out that this result depends
crucially on the exact nature of the renegotiation game; it is not certain whether or not it can be
endogenously designed ex ante. They consider the so called "deal-me-out" bargaining game. In
such a game, each party receives half of the gains from renegotiation, except in the case when
one party receives a payoff less than his outside option payoff. Upon such condition, the worse-
off party would go for his out-side payoff, while the other party is the residual claimant. Under
such a bargaining rule, a party's incentive to invest may sometimes be strengthened when he
loses asset ownership. The reason is simple: if party i owns the asset but his payoff from an
outside trade is larger, he will default on the contract. On the other hand, party j 4, as the residual
claimant of the total surplus, will have an incentive to invest provided that his investment does
not constitute at least half of the ex post total surplus and exceeds party j's outside trade payoff.
Schmitz (2001) criticizes the incomplete contract approach for its inability to predict an optimal
contract. Let a certain allocation problem be given. If a researcher takes only contracts C1 and C2
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into consideration and conjectures that C1 is optimal, one cannot be sure that there is no superior
contract C3. It is therefore critical to justify why he considers only C1 and C2. However, if one
can prove that there is no contract superior to C1 and C2, then he is back in the world of complete
contracts, since such a proof requires the assumption of perfect rationality.
Maskin and Tirole (1999a) point out that for the incomplete contract approach to work, agents
should be able to foresee the expected payoff from ex post renegotiation, so they can conduct
dynamic programming to determine their optimal ex ante investment decision. This assumption
endows the agent with perfect rationality. They then argue that, if agents possess perfect
rationality, they should be able to construct a complete contract mechanism to govern the contract.
They therefore conclude that the informal justification for contractual incompleteness based on ex
ante indescribability of actions of trade is unconvincing. They further construct a series of
propositions showing that as long as an agent's expected utility is quasi-linear in payoff, they can
forgo considering unverifiable states of nature and design a mechanism that allows renegotiation
to close the trade.
Incomplete contract proponents reject this criticism. For such a mechanism to work, it should not
be renegotiated ex post. Further, Hart and Moore (1999), and Segal (1999) describe a bilateral
monopoly environment with many potentially tradable goods. They show that, when the number
of goods tends to infinity, the buyer and the seller cannot gain from a contractual relationship.
It is generally believed (Maskin and Tirole(1 999a,b), Hart and Moore(1999), Brousseau and
Glachant(200 1) for example) that given the prevalence of simple contracts in the real world, it
would be unreasonable to neglect incomplete contracts. Further, incomplete contracts may reside
in a realm where agents possess weaker- than-perfect rationality.
2.4 PPP Financial Contracting
The capital structure problem remains a working issue for financial economists. What is the
optimal capital structure? Is debt or equity is the better financial instrument for a given firm or a
project? After Modigliani and Miller's (1958, 1961) two propositions showed that capital
(debt/equity) structure does not affect a firm's value, the study of capital structure shifted to the
agency problem underlying a given financial problem.
The financial structure of a project is determined by the set of financial contracts agreed upon by
the parties involved. To analyze the agency problem underlying a given financial structure of a
PPP project, it is critical to understand the nature of financial contracts. Aghion and Bolton (1992)
argue that financial contracts are essentially incomplete contracts:
"In practice the difficulty in confronting this (allocation) problem arises from the
inherent incompleteness of financial contracts. Most investment projects are sufficiently
complex that it is impossible for the contracting parties to specify ex ante an action
correspondence a--, A determining which action ought to be taken as a function of the
state of nature, 0. Even if such a correspondence a(O) could be specified it may be
difficult to enforce ex post. Consequently, the contracting parties must find roundabout
ways of implementing the most desired action-schedule, a(), such as partial or total
delegation of decision rights (over the future action choice) to one or the other party
together with an appropriate monetary incentive scheme."
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Financial contracts often leave out how agents should act under each specific circumstance unless
some certain threat point (i.e. default) is met. A key feature of a financial contract is its emphasis
on the allocation of property rights. Zender (1991) argues that debt serves as a mechanism for the
contingent allocation of control: the debtor retains the control right of the underlying asset as long
as he meets the liability repayment schedule. The creditor possesses the control right to liquidate
the underlying asset when debtor fails to meet his obligation.
Aghion and Bolton (1992) show that a property right regime is analogous to a financial structure
regime: (1) If it is best to give full control to the investor, the firm should issue voting equity. (2)
If it is best to give full control to the entrepreneur, the firm should issue non-voting equity. (3) If
it is better to adopt joint ownership, the entrepreneur and the investor should set up a trust or a
partnership. (4) If it is efficient to allocate control contingent on the state of nature, the firm
should issue ordinary debt, convertible debt, warrants, or convertible preferred stock.
So far, the application of incomplete contract theory to PPP financial contracting remains limited.
Dewatripont and Legros (2005) use the incomplete contract framework to examine the external
financing effect of PPP contracting. They show that debt works as a better financing security (as
opposed to external equity) in terms of effort induction. The rational is simple: while the agent is
the residual claimant of his cost-reducing effort; the agent's ex post payoff from his cost-reducing
effort is diluted with an equity contract.
Given that real financial contracts are, in the main, incomplete contracts, it is naturally difficult to
structure a complete contract mechanism with pure financial provisions. In other words, when
studying an agency problem by examining exclusively the ex post renegotiation game, we will
not be able to utilize the revelation principle to devise a mechanism that induces socially optimal
effort. Fortunately, we will show in the next chapter that in the realm of PPP contracting,
financial structure actually has some monotone effects on the agent's cost-reducing effort. This
provides the information needed for PPP contract design.
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Chapter 3 The Model of PPP Financial Contracting
In this chapter a model is developed to study the functional relationship between financial
structure and agent's effort incentive in PPP contracts. I focus on a simple financial structure
consisting of equity and a performance bond from the agent, the debt borrowed by the agent from
the bank, and an amount of regulated revenue that the agent is allowed to derive at the operation
stage of the project. The control right regime is determined by the characteristic of the debt. For
full-recourse debt, the government will pay back the debt and assume ownership of the project
when the agent defaults. For non-recourse debt, the bank will be entitled to the ownership of the
project when the agent defaults.
3.1 Model setup
I consider a project that lasts two periods and has three critical dates. At date 0, the participants of
the project (the government, the bank, and the agent) sign a set of contracts specifying the
financial structure of the project and the control rights regime of the underlying assets.
After the contract is signed, the agent determines a level of effort to reduce the construction cost
of the project. I assume that the total construction cost is ex ante uncertain. The agent's cost-
reducing effort can reduce a specific amount of the cost but it cannot fully determine the final
construction cost.
At date 1, the uncertain construction cost is realized. If the cost is lower than the initial capital
investment, the incumbent agent completes the project with the existing capital. If the cost is
higher than the initial capital investment, three possible scenario outcomes may happen: (1) the
agent makes up the capital shortfall and finishes the project, (2) the control right owner takes over
the project and hires a new agent to complete the project, and (3) the parties renegotiate a new
contract under which the incumbent agent completes the project.
At date 2, the project is completed, the consumer surplus is realized and the parties derived their
payoffs in accordance to the contract. The timeline of the model is shown in Figure 3-1.
Time 0 2
Parties sign a contract set Uncertain cost is realized. The project is completed
specifing the financial structure The parties determine the and the consumer surplus is
and the control right regime. scenario outcome to realized. Parties derive
Then the agent exerts effort. proceed with the project. their respective payoffs.
Figure 3-1 The timeline of the model
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Model notation and the assumptions for the notations are summarized as follows:
P : Party i's equity investment at datej (here i e {a, g} where a refers to the agent, and g refers to
the government; j e {0,1,2}). It is assumed that at date 0 only the agent invests equity, so 10
represents the agent's date 0 equity investment.
Di: the debt that the agent borrows from the bank at date .
Ri: the agent's date 2 revenue that is agreed to by all parties at datej.
X: the uncertain construction cost. Let x denote the realized value of X
Let F(.), f(-) , and (x, oo) be respectively the cumulative distribution function, the probability
density function, and the support of X
e: the agent's cost-reducing effort.
V/(.): the cost reduction function.
S: the consumer surplus that is realized from the implementation of the project. S is assumed to be
a fixed value and is known to all parties ex ante.
1
ra: the agent's weighted average cost of capital. Define by a the agent's discount rate.
1+ ra
1
rb: the bank's weighted average cost of capital. Define by 8 1 the bank's discount rate.
1+ r
1
rg: the government's interest rate. Define by y the government's discount rate.
1+ rg
65: the social cost of public funds (that is, distortionary taxation inflicts disutility $ (1+ ) to a
levy of $1 by the state).f the incremental proportion of the new agent's fee to complete the project. In other words, for
every dollar the existing agent needs to finish the project, it costs (1+J) dollars for the control
right owner to hire a new agent to finish the project.
(A l)It is assumed that f(-) is strictly positive in the relevant range.
(A2)It is assumed that e is (1) expressible in dollars, and (2) unverifiable so uncontractible.
(A3)It is assumed that the cost reduction strictly increases with e at a strictly decreasing rate:
/'(.)> 0 and q"(-)<0 .
(A4)It is assumed thatf>O.
There exist four possible scenario outcomes that can obtain. These scenario outcomes are defined
as follows:
(1) No reinvestment: The initial capital investment is sufficient to cover the construction cost
(I0 + Do > x - y(e)). The agent finishes the project with existing capital.
(2) Self-enforcement: The initial capital investment is insufficient to cover the construction
cost (I0 + Do < x - q,(e)). The agent makes up the capital shortfall, completes the project
and derives the revenue specified in the original contract.
(3) New agent: The initial capital investment is insufficient to cover the construction cost
(10 + Do < x - ql(e)). The control right owner takes control of the underlying asset and
hires a new agent to complete the project.
(4) New contract: The initial capital investment is insufficient to cover the construction cost
(10 + Do < x - q'(e)). The parties renegotiate a new contract under which the current
agent completes the project.
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Given these four possible scenario outcomes, the parties' decision rules for any given realization
of x can be illustrated as in Figure 3-2.
Initial investment is sufficient i-ito cover the cost
Sign (I 0 ,DOR 0 ) Agent's payoff with the old
contract is greater than the S
payoff with the new contract
Initial inves ment is Control right owner's
insufficient t cover st payoff with the new agent
is greater than her payoff
with the existing agent
Agent's payoff ith the old
contract is small r than the
payoff with a ne contr t
Control right owner's
payoff with the new
agent is smaller than
her payoff with the
existing agent F-
Figure 3-2 The parties' decision rules under a given contract ( ODO, RO, H)
(Note: This is not the decision tree)
After the uncertain cost is realized, the parties can reinvest new capital greater than or equal to
the capital shortfall. Moreover, the investment made by the agent can be in the form of equity,
debt, or a combination of both. Without loss of generality, I make the following three basic
assumptions:
(Assumption 1): In the renegotiation game, the required new investment is set equal to the
capital shortfall.
(Assumption 2): The agent makes up all his reinvestment with equity.
(Assumption 3): The parties' interest rates satisfy ra > rb > rg > 0 (or 0 < a </J < y <1).
To simplify our analysis, I make the following four additional assumptions:
(Assumption 4): All ex post renegotiation games are Nash bargaining games. In addition, all
parties know ex ante that any ex post renegotiation game is a Nash bargaining
game.
(Assumption 5): All parties have common priors about the uncertain cost X
(Assumption 6): All parties are risk-neutral.
24
No reinvestment: Agent finishes the
project with the initial capital investb4
elf-enforcement: Agent makes up the
apital shortfall and finishes the projec 1
New agent: The control right owner takes
over the project and hires a new agent to
complete the project
New contract: Parties renegotiate a new
contract (Ijr, Ia , R)
(Assumption 7): The contracting game is a one-time game (so no relationship concern).
(Assumption 8): The interest rate for the debt is the bank's cost of capital. The interest rate for
the performance bond is the agent's cost of capital.
One of our objectives with the model is to examine the efficiency of the contract under different
financial structures and control right regimes. We know that the agent's date 0 effort e yields a
date 1 cost reduction yI(e). The net present value of the gain from this cost-reducing effort is thus
ay(e) - e. The first best effort e* is then defined as follows:
(Definition 0): The first best effort e* is one that satisfies the first order condition: Y'(e) = -.
a
In other words, the first best effort is the effort at which the marginal cost equals the marginal
gain from the agent's perspective.
We can now proceed with the analysis. The analysis is done in six steps:
(1) Determine parties' payoffs under the four possible scenario outcomes.
(2) Analyze the properties of the break-even costs that separate the four possible scenario
outcomes.
(3) Determine the possible equilibrium scenario outcomes for any given contract (I0,D o , R0 ).
(4) Calculate the parties' expected payoff given their priors on X
(5) Use backward induction to determine the agent's optimal cost-reducing effort.
(6) Use comparative statics to examine whether and how the level of debt affects the agent's
optimal cost-reducing effort.
3.2 Full-recourse Debt Contract
In this section we consider a financial contract that employs a full-recourse debt control right
regime. Following chapter 3-2, it is assumed that under a full-recourse debt regime, the interest
rate for the debt is simply the bank's weighted average cost of capital.
The possible scenario outcomes for a full-recourse debt contract are as follows:
I~ D(a) If the realized x exhibits x - g(e) -+ -, the agent finishes the project with the
a a
existing capital.
I~ D
(b) If the realized x exhibits x - yf(e) > * + Do , the parties' decisions proceed in the
a a
following sequence:
a. The agent determines whether or not to make up the remaining shortfall to complete
the project.
b. If the agent does not make up the shortfall, the government and the agent may
renegotiate a new contract (Ig , I , RI).
25
c. If the government and the agent cannot reach an agreement for a new contract, the
government confiscates the performance bond, pays off the debt, takes control of the
underlying asset, and hires a new agent to complete the project.
The parties' decision problem under a full-recourse debt contract can be illustrated with the tree
in Figure 3-2. A full-recourse debt contract thus has the following four possible scenario
outcomes: no-reinvestment, self-enforcement, new agent and new contract. We can now proceed
with the analysis.
3.2.1 Parties' Payoffs in the four Scenario Outcomes
In this section we calculate parties' payoffs in the four scenarios: (1) No reinvestment, (2) Self-
enforcement, (3)New Agent, and (4) New contract.
(1) No reinvestment
Table 3-1 summarizes parties' cash flows from date 0 to date 2 in the No Reinvestment
scenario. The NPV of parties' date 0 net payoffs can be calculated accordingly.
Table 3-1 Accounting sheet for the "No-reinvestment" scenario
in a full recourse debt contract
Agent Government Bank
Date 0 Debt Do 
- Do
PB -H
Effort 
-e
Date 1 Construction cost - x + g(e)
Date 2 Consumer surplus S
Revenue R 
- Ro
Debt Service Do Do
) 2  #2
PB payback H
a 2
The agent's date 0 net payoff = discounted revenue + debt - PB - discounted debt payment -
discounted construction cost - discounted PB payback - cost-
reducing effort
= a 2 R - a(x - I/(e))+(-a )D -e)6 2 0 _
The government's date 0 net payoff= discounted consumer surplus - discounted revenue
= 72(S - RO)
The bank's date 0 net payoff = discounted debt payment - debt = 0
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Since a < Y , the coefficient of H is strictly negative (- <
high opportunity cost of capital.
(2) Self-enforcement
Table 3-2 summarizes parties' cash flows from date 0 to date 2 in the Self-enforcement
scenario. The NPV of parties' date 1 and date 0 net payoffs can be calculated accordingly.
Table 3-2 Accounting sheet for the "Self-enforcement" scenario
in a full recourse debt contract
Agent Government Bank
Date 0 Debt Do 
- Do
PB -H
Effort -e
Date 1 Construction - x + yi(e)
cost
Date 2 Consumer S
surplus
Revenue R0  - RO
Debt Service Do Do
p2 8
2
PB payback H
a 2
The agent's date 1 net payoff = discounted revenue - reinvestment (capital shortfall) -
discounted debt payment + discounted PB payback
I 1 a +H
= R0 -x+ (e)J+ + 2 )DO -0 a a p2 a
The government's date 1 net payoff= discounted consumer surplus - discounted
revenue
= y(S - RO)
The bank's date 1 net payoff = discounted debt service =
The agent's date 0 net payoff = discounted agent's date 1 net payoff - equity - PB - cost-
reducing effort
a 2RO -a(x--y(e))+ 1- a Do -e
The government's date 0 net payoff= discounted consumer surplus - discounted revenue
= 7
2 (S-RO)
The bank's date 0 net payoff = discounted debt payment - debt = 0
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+ a)< 0 ). The agent loses for his
(3) New Agent
Table 3-3 summarizes parties' cash flows from date 0 to date 2 in the New Agent scenario.
The NPV of parties' date 1 and date 0 net payoffs can be calculated accordingly.
Table 3-3 Accounting sheet for the "New Agent" scenario
in a full recourse debt contract
Agent Government Bank
Date 0 Debt Do 
- Do
PB -H
Effort -e
Date 1 Debt service D D(1+ 0
PB transfer H
New agent's fee I D
- (I +0)(1 + f) x - qI(e)
Date 2 Consumer surplus S
The agent's net date 1 payoff = 0
The government's date 1 net payoff = discounted consumer surplus - new agent fee valued at
the social cost - debt service valued at the social cost +
PB transfer
= ?S-(+d) (l+f) x-Yi(e) - + o+
The bank's date 1 net payoff = discounted debt service = Do
/8
The agent's date 0 net payoff = initial debt - cost-reducing effort - agent's construction
expenditure - PB
- h - H - e
The government's date 0 net payoff= discounted consumer surplus - new agent fee valued at
the social cost - debt service valued at the social cost
=1 2S -,V(+ 8) 01+ f) x - Ve) - 0 -Do +Do +.H f
I ~ a a) 8 a
The bank's date 0 net payoff = discounted debt service - debt = 0
(4) New contract
Table 3-4 summarizes parties' cash flows from date 0 to date 2 in the New Contract scenario.
The NPV of parties' date 1 and date 0 net payoffs can be calculated accordingly.
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Table 3-4 Accounting sheet for the "New Contract" scenario
in a full recourse debt contract
Agent Government Bank
Date 0 Debt Do 
- Do
PB -H
Effort -e
Date 1 Government's Ig -(1+,5)I,
Investment
Construction cost - x + ql(e)
Date 2 Consumer Surplus S
Renegotiated Ri - R1
Revenue
Debt Service - Do Do
2 Y2
PB payback H
a 2
The agent's date 1 net payoff = discounted revenue + government reinvestment - capital
shortfall - discounted debt payment + discounted PB payback
= aR 1 - x +(e)+ + 
a
I a H
I f+ -- Do +-(a '8 a
The government's date 1 net payoff = discounted consumer surplus - discounted revenue -
government investment valued at the social cost
=y(S - RI) - (1+5)Ig
The bank's date 1 net payoff = discounted debt service = "o
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The agent's date 0 net payoff= discounted agent's date 1 net payoff - equity - PB - cost-
reducing effort
= a2R -a[x -(e)-Ij9]+ 1- a DO -e
The government's date 0 net payoff= discounted consumer surplus - discounted revenue -
government investment valued at the social cost
=Y2 (S - RI) -,(+ 9)I9
The bank's date 0 net payoff= debt - discounted debt service = 0
We next determine the values of If, I a and R in the renegotiation game.
Proposition 1: The renegotiated contract specifies
(If I') = (0, x - (e) _ ) if - <1+ (
a a a
I D y
IfI)= (x - a(e) - L ,0) if ->1+9
a a a
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Proposition 1 shows that at the Pareto optimal the parties reinvest with the agent's funding if
the cost of public funds is expensive and they reinvest with the government's funding if the
cost of public funds is cheap. Any reinvestment made by the agent must be justified by a
reward that allows the agent to have a non-negative payoff after renegotiation.
Consider the following rate value: 8=0.3, rg = 0.04, and r, = 0.14. After calculation:
y l+r
- = 1.09 <1+8 =1.3. This example shows that in general the social cost of public
a I+ rg
funds is expensive (the condition <1+ holds for most cases). We shall therefore proceed
a
with our analysis under the following assumption:
(Assumption 9): The project exhibits: -L <1+ 8.
a
Assumption 9 is critical as it determines the bargaining outcome of the renegotiation game,
which in turn determines the equilibrium game form that can occur to a contract. It will be
shown in the latter analysis that if the project exhibits -L > 1+ 5, the possible equilibrium
a
game forms of a PPP contract will be different from the equilibrium game forms we get in
section 3.2.3. However, I note at this point that this model is most useful for developed
economies where the costs of public funds are normally high, and the government's rational
behavior is to raise revenue versus equity when default occurs.
With assumption 9, the contract specifies If = 0. Let R,* and R1 , be respectively the upper
bound and the lower bound ofR1 . The Pareto frontier of the renegotiation game is a straight
line with the government and the agent bargaining over Ri E [RI , R1, ] 4 . We can now
determine the value of renegotiated revenue R,.
Proposition 2: The renegotiated contract specifies:
R = jx_ x- (e) -L+ A2 Do - (aY)H
2ay a 2a2y 2a 2y
Where
Al=a(l+S)(1+f)+Y
a 2 (1 + ( 1 +)(+f) a2
1 #2
It can be easily verified that R = -(R I + R1.): The government and the agent divide the2
consumer surplus equally in the renegotiation game.
Now that (If ,I, , R) are determined, we can calculate the parties' net payoffs with the new
contract at date 1 and date 0. To further simplify the notation, we let
4 The value of Ri* and R, are specified in Appendix 1.
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A3 = a(1+)(1+ f)-y
a 2 (1+ (5) a 2y
A4 = - a(1+ 5)(1+ f)+ y 2
The agent's date 1 net payoff with the new contract is:
UI(New Contract) = A(xVy(e)i 1+ A4 DO + H (3-1)27 a ) 2a 2ay
The government's date 1 net payoff with the new contract is:
V(ewCnrc)=6 S x, - y(e) -1 -2Do + ( v)H (3-2)V -(New Contract) 2a a ) 2a 2  0 2a 2
The agent's date 0 net payoff with the new contract is:
UO(New Contract) = 2y (x-V1(e))0-L 1 + A4Do - a+v)H -e (3-3)
The government's date 0 net payoff with the new contract is:
VO(New Contract) 2 7 1 x-(e)- -A 2 Do + H (3-4)2a a )2a 2  2a 2
3.2.2 The Break-even Costs That Separate the Four Scenarios
We know Ve e [0, oo) there exists a corresponding set of construction costs that separate the four
possible scenario outcomes. The value of these break-even costs change with (1) the magnitude
of the agent's cost-reducing effort e, and (2) the values of (10, D o , RO ,H).
Definition 1: xi is the cost at which the initial capital investment breaks even with the
construction cost:
I~ D0
x, = W(e) + I+ D
a a
Definition 2: x 2 is the cost at which the agent is indifferent between self-enforcement of the
existing contract or renegotiation of a new contract :
1 A 2ay (+
x2 y(e) + -I -- Do + RO + H
a aA, A1  aA,
Definition 3: x 3 is the cost at which the parties are indifferent between renegotiating a new
contract or letting the government take over the project6:
5 x2 is derived by letting the agent's self-enforcing payoff equal the agent's new contract payoff:
RO - x2 +(e)+-"-+ 2-A Do +-= -(x 2 -V1(e)-)+ A4 Do+ H
a a /32 a 2y a 2ay 2ay
6 X3 is derived by letting R= Rl,:
(16~I D D01 H 1 FI ~1(ii1 H(1+f)(x3 - q(e) --1-_P )+- -- =- x3- (e)-- ----- IDO
rL a a 8 _ ay a a_ a 32 ) a
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x = V/(e)+ I I +- Do +- H
a aA 3  aA3
The relationship between a realized construction cost x and the resulting scenario outcome is laid
out as follows:
(1) x x,: The initial capital investment is sufficient to cover the construction cost. No
reinvestment is needed to complete the project.
x > xI: The initial capital investment is insufficient to cover the construction cost.
Reinvestment is needed to complete the project.
(2) x > x 2 : The agent's self-enforcing payoff is smaller than his new contract payoff. The agent
does not make up the shortfall.
x x 2 : The agent's self-enforcing payoff is greater than his new contract payoff. The agent
makes up the shortfall.
(3) x > x 3 : The government' maximal acceptable renegotiated revenue is greater than the agent's
minimal acceptable renegotiated revenue (R,* > Rl,). The parties renegotiate a new
contract.
x x 3 : The government' maximal acceptable renegotiated revenue is smaller than the agent's
minimal acceptable renegotiated revenue (R I < Rl,). The government takes control of
the project.
Definition 1 and 3 show that the relationship between x, and x3 is exogenously determined (it
depends on the values of a, 8, y, S, and f ) and cannot be changed by structuring
(Io,DO, RO ,H). On the other hand, the relationship between x, and x2 and the relationship
between x2 and x 3 are contract-specific and can be determined by structuring (I, DO RO H).
Proposition 3: Contract (I ,DO, RO ,H) exhibits the following properties:
(1) xI > X3
(2) XI = X2 when Ro = A5 DO -(a ± H
(3) x 2 = x 3  when R0 = A6 DO + H(l)(l+f)IH
aA3
where
_ 
V ++ (5)p8A5  2/ 2y
and
1 ( +)(a(1+ f) -B)
A6 
2 A3
Proposition 3-(1) holds as long as the cost of public fund is more expensive than the costs of
private funds (assumption 8 holds). Proposition 3-(2) and 3-(3) show that participants of the
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contract can adjust the values of R, Do and H to determine the ordering of x1, X2, andx It can
be easily verified that x > x2 if R0 <A 5D 0 - 2r) H (alternatively x < x2 if
2a2 y
R 0 > ADo -(a ) H), and x2 > X3 if R >A D -[ ( + H (alternatively2a 2 2 aA 3
x 2 < x 3if RJ <A 6D + [I( (1 H f)] ).
aA3
3.2.3 Financial Structure and Contract Type
From proposition 3-(1), there exists three possible orderings of x,, x2 , and x3 : x, > x2 > X3
x1 > x3 > X2 , and x2 > X1 > X3 . However, it can be shown that there exist only two contract types
in equilibrium.
Proposition 4: When assumption 3 holds, only two types of contract exist:
(1) For contracts specifying R1 > A5DO - 2a ± H, the possible scenario
2a y
outcomes are: No investment, self-enforcement, and new contract.
(2) For contracts specifying R0 < A5DO - 2 H0 , the possible scenario2a 2  ,
outcomes are: No investment and new contract.
3.2.4 Parties' Expected Payoffs with The Two Contract Types
Once the values of ( , DO, R0 ) are chosen, the contract type is determined and the parties'
expected payoffs can be calculated. To simplify the notation in writing the parties' payoffs, we let:
B7 =a 2 R0 + - 2D
and
A1  A (a~y)HB8 = -IO+ A4DO- H2y 27 27
We now define the two contract types as follows:
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(1) Type F-I contract:
A Type F-I contract is a full-recourse debt contract that has the following three equilibrium
scenario outcomes: no reinvestment, self-enforcement, and new contract. A contract is a Type
I contract if the contract specifies R0 > A5DO - (a +Y H (thus making x 2 > X1 > x3 ). The
2a y
parties' payoffs with a Type F-I contract are shown in Figure 3-3.
x x1 No reinvestment
Sign (10 ,DO, R0 )
x X2  Self-enforcement
x > xo
X 2 New contract
Agent: B 7 - a(x - y (e)) - e
Bank:O
Government: v2 (S - RO)
Agent: B7 - a(x -yV(e)) - e
Bank:O
Government: y2 (S - RO)
Agent: B8 + aA 3 (x - I/(e))- e
2Y
Bank:O
Government: 72S A' (x-,/(e))- B82a a
Figure 3-3 The parties' payoffs with a Type F-I contract
The agent's date 0 expected payoff with a Type F-I contract is:
EUO(TyPeFI) = V(e)+B 7 -BF (e)) -a f2dx)+ = xd1(x) ( -e
2x 2v x2(e) 2y
The government's date 0 expected payoff with a Type F-I contract is:
EJ(TyPeF-I) = 2 _y 2 R0F(x 2 (e)) + y(e) - B - F(x 2 (e)) xdF(x)
a2 a 2a X(e)
The bank's date 0 payoff is 0 with certainty. For the parties to agree on a Type I contract,
the contract must satisfy both EUO(Type F-I) 0, and EVO(Type F-I) 0
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(3-5)
(3-6)
(2) Type F-II contract:
A Type F-II contract is a full recourse debt contract that has the following two equilibrium
scenario outcomes: no reinvestment and new contract. A contract is a Type F-II contract if the
contract specifies R0 < A5 DO - a 2 H (thus making xi > x 2 > x 3 and x, > x 3 > x 2 ). The
2a 2 w
agent's payoffs with a Type F-LI contract are shown in Figure 3-4.
X No reinvestment
Sign (10 ,DO,RO)
X X1 New contract
Agent: B7 - a(x - y (e)) - e
Bank:O
Government: V2 (S - RO)
Agent: B + aA3 (x - (e))-e
Bank:O
Government: y2S 2 (x-V(e)) -2 B2a a
Figure 3-4 The parties' payoffs with a Type F-II contract
The agent's date 0 expected payoff with a Type F-II contract is:
EaA1 x,(e)
EUO(Type F-II) =2y V(e) + B7 - B 8 F(x, (e)) - a JxdF(x)
aA3 * aA
+ 3 xdF(x) - q(e)+ B8 e
2y x(e) 2y
The government's date 0 expected payoff with a Type F-II contract is:
EV(TypeF-II) Y 2 S _y 2 RF(x(e))+ if (e)-r B8 (1-F(x (e)))- JfxdF(x)
a(2 a ) 2a xj(e)
(3-7)
(3-8)
The bank's date 0 payoff is 0 with certainty. For the parties to agree on a Type F-II contract,
the contract must satisfy both EU(Type F-H) 0, and EVO(Type F-I) 0
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3.2.5 Agent's optimal cost-reducing effort
By now we know that there exist only two contract types when the contract employs a full-
recourse debt control right mechanism. In this sub-section we examine the effect of financial
structure over agent's optimal cost-reducing effort. We will show (1) Type I contract induces
higher level of cost-reduce effort than Type II contract, and (2) For both contract types, the
agent's cost-reducing effort decreases with the magnitude of equity and increases with the
magnitude of a performance bond under a given initial capital investment.
Now we calculate the agent's optimal cost-reducing effort in Type F-I and Type F-II contracts.
(1) Type F-I contract
The agent's optimal cost-reducing effort for a Type F-I contract satisfies the first order
condition:
8EUO(Type F-I) 
_ a (AF(x2(e)) - A3 VX'(e) -1 = 0 (3-9)
ae 2y
1
The term I (AF(x2 (e)) - A3 ) represents the hold-up effect. It is the weighted sum of the2y
agent's share of gains in the No reinvestment, Self-enforcement, and New contract scenarios.
We know Vx > x 2 the agent's gain from cost-reduction will be shared with the government in
the ex post bargaining game so the agent's gain become discounted at the x = x 2 .
(2) Type F-II contract
The agent's optimal cost-reducing effort for a Type F-IL contract satisfies the first order
condition:
UO(TypeF- =a (A F(x(e))-A 3)+aRO -aAD + H (x(e)) J/(e)-1=0 (3-10)
The first term - (AF(x, (e)) - A3 ) represents the hold-up effect. It is the weighted sum of2y
the agent's share of gains in the No reinvestment, and New contract scenarios. We know
Vx > x1 the agent's gain from cost-reduction will be shared with the government in the ex
post bargaining game so his gain is discounted.
The second term aRO - aA5 DO + a+y H f(x(e)) is the marginal gain the agent gets from
2ay
an adjustment in the revenue in the New Contract scenario. For R0 - A5DO + is negative
in Type F-II contracts, the low revenue (and the low performance bond as well) essentially
post as a disincentive for the agent to make efforts. In other words, the agent exerts lower
level of effort for a lower revenue contract with a hope to renegotiate the revenue through ex
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post bargaining. The term aRO - aA5DO + a ± 'H )f(xl (e)) represents the self-enforcement2ay ,
effect.
Equation (3-9) and (3-10) show that the financial structure as well as the distribution of x affect
the agent's optimal choice of e. Note that if the agent firmly believes that the initial capital
investment is sufficient to cover the construction cost (so f(x) = 0, F(x,) = F(x2 ) = 1), the
1
agent's optimal efforts in both Type F-I and Type F-II contracts satisfy Y/'(e)= -. That is, the
a
agent exerts first best efforts in both contract types.
3.2.6 Financial Structure and Agent's Effort Incentive
We now assume that at date 0 the parties set the initial capital investment at a fixed value
I+ Do= 7r , where ir is a fixed value that satisfies r e r = [DO ,S]. The three decision variables
are DO , P and R0 . (I0 is determined by I = n - DO)
With the introduction of 7r, we rewrite x1 , x2 and B2 as follows:
X1= y'(e) +-
a
;r 2ayA 2ay (a ± )
x2 = y/(e) +- -0D + Ra' +H
a Al Al aA
We will now compare the agent's optimal efforts in Type F-I and Type F-I contracts under a
given initial capital investment.
Proposition 5: For any given initial capital investment r e n, the order of the agent's optimal
cost-reducing effort is eTypeFI > eTypeF-ll
Proposition 5 shows that for any given ;r e ;, the agent's cost-reducing effort is always higher
with a Type F-I contract than with a Type F-II contract regardless of the setting of the
relationships between other contractual terms. It means that the agent exerts higher level of effort
whenever the possibility of self-enforcement exists.
We now examine the effect of capital structure over the agent's optimal cost-reducing effort.
Proposition 6: For any given initial capital investment n e ;r, the agent's optimal cost-
reducing effort (1) decreases with the level of debt, and (2) increases with the
magnitude of the performance bond in a full-recourse debt contract.
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Proposition 6 shows that for contracts that have the same values for debt, equity and revenue, a
contract that employs a performance bond always induce higher level of cost-reducing effort than
a contract without performance bond. Notice that the agent's optimal cost-reducing effort is a
function of revenue, performance, debt, parties' cost of capitals, the social cost of public funds,
the new agent's cost, the probability of cost-overrun. It can observed that most parameters are
predetermined before the contract is signed. After a contract is signed, whether or not the agent
will exert first best effort depends substantially on the agent's prior about X.
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3.3 Non-recourse Debt
In this section we consider a financial contract with a non-recourse debt control right regime.
Following section 3-2, let rr be the interest rate for the non-recourse debt and denote by
1
p = the discount rate for the debt. We assume that under the non-recourse debt regime, the
1+ r,
bank charges a risk premium for the debt so rr > r, and o < p .
The parties' decision rule under a non-recourse debt contract is as follows:
(a) If the realized x exhibits x - yi(e) ; I + Do, the agent finishes the project with the
existing capital.
(b) If the realized x exhibits x - yq(e) > I0 + Do, the parties' decisions proceed in the
following sequence:
a. The agent determines whether or not to make up the remaining capital shortfall to
complete the project.
b. If the agent does not make up the shortfall, two renegotiations may occur:
i. The agent and the bank may renegotiate a new fee P for the agent to pay to
the bank at date 2 such that the latter will not seize the project.
ii. The government and the agent may renegotiate over new reinvestments
(If, I") and new revenue R, such that the agent is willing to complete the
project.
c. If no agreement between the agent and the bank can be reached, the agent defaults.
Under such condition the government confiscates the performance bond, and the
bank takes over the underlying asset and hires a new agent to complete the project.
The parties' decision problem can be illustrated with the same tree depicted in Figure 3-2. A non-
recourse contract thus shares with a full-recourse debt contract the same possible scenario
outcomes: No-investment, self-enforcement, new agent and new contract. We can now proceed
with the analysis.
3.3.1 Parties' payoffs in the four scenarios
In this section we calculate parties' in the four scenarios: (1) No reinvestment, (2) Self-
enforcement, (3)New Agent, and (4) New contract.
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(1) No reinvestment
Table 3-5 summarizes parties' cash flows from date 0 to date 2 in the No Reinvestment
scenario. The NPV of parties' date 0 net payoffs can be calculated accordingly.
Table 3-5 Accounting sheet for the "No-reinvestment" scenario
in a non-recourse debt contract
Agent Governme Bank
nt
Date 0 Debt Do 
- Do
PB -H
Effort -e
Date 1 Construction cost - x + I/(e)
Date 2 Consumer surplus S
Revenue R0  - RO
Debt Service Do Do
p02 102
PB payback H
a 2
The agent's date 0 net payoff = discounted revenue + debt - PB - discounted debt payment -
discounted construction cost - cost-reducing effort + discounted
PB payback
= a 2 R - a(x - y/(e))+(1 - a)D -e
P20
The government's date 0 net payoff= discounted consumer surplus - discounted revenue
= 72(S-RO)
The bank's date 0 net payoff = discounted debt payment - debt = -1 D
Since p < ,8, the coefficient of D0 is strictly positive ( 82 > 0 ). The bank gains from the
risk premium charges to the debt.
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(2) Self-enforcement
Table 3-6 summarizes parties' cash flows from date 0 to date 2 in the Self-enforcement
scenario. The NPV of parties' date 1 and date 0 net payoffs can be calculated accordingly.
Table 3-6 Accounting sheet for "Self-enforcement"
in a non-recourse debt contract
Agent Government Bank
Date 0 Debt Do 
- Do
PB -H
Effort -e
Date 1 Construction cost - x + yi(e)
Date 2 Consumer surplus S
Revenue RO 
- RO
Debt Service Do Do
P2 
P2
PB payback H
a 2
The agent's date 1 net payoff = discounted revenue - reinvestment (capital shortfall) -
discounted debt payment + discounted PB payback
= aR 0 - x + q'(e) + + K a DO +-H0 a a p 2 a
The government's date 1 net payoff = discounted consumer surplus - discounted
revenue
= y(S - RO)
The bank's date 1 net payoff = discounted debt service = BDO
P2
The agent's date 0 net payoff = discounted agent's date 1 net payoff - equity - PB - cost-
reducing effort
a2k -a(x -V(e))+ 1- a 1DO -e
The government's date 0 payoff= discounted consumer surplus - discounted revenue
= Y2 (S -RO)
The bank's date 0 net payoff = discounted debt payment - debt = 2 -1 D
P2 )0
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(3) New Agent
Table 3-7 summarizes parties' cash flows from date 0 to date 2 in the New Agent scenario.
The NPV of parties' date 1 and date 0 net payoffs can be calculated accordingly.
Table 3-7 Accounting sheet for "New Agent"
in a non-recourse debt contract
Agent Government Bank
Date 0 Debt Do 
- Do
PB -H
Effort -e
Date 1 New agent's fee 
-(1+ f)Lx - I(e) - Do
_a a
PB transfer H
a
Date 2 Consumer surplus S
Revenue 
- RO R0
The agent's date 1 net payoff = 0
The government's date 1 net payoff= discounted consumer surplus - discounted revenue +
PB transfer
= (S -Ro+ H+
a
The bank's date 1 net payoff = discounted revenue - new agent fee
=8RO -(I+ f) x - yf(e) - -o
a a
The agent's date 0 net payoff = initial debt - cost-reducing effort - agent's construction
expenditure - PB
= - - H - e
The government's date 0 net payoff = discounted consumer surplus - discounted revenue +
PB
= -2(sR)+ H
a
The bank's date 0 net payoff = discounted revenue - discounted new agent fee - debt
= 2R - (1+ f)(x - (e)-D
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(4) New contract
Let P be the agent's renegotiated payment to the bank at date 2. Table 3-8 summarizes
parties' cash flows from date 0 to date 2 in the New Contract scenario. The NPV of parties'
date 1 and date 0 net payoffs can be calculated accordingly.
Table 3-8 Accounting sheet for "New Contract"
in a non-recourse debt contract
Agent Government Bank
Date 0 Debt Do 
- Do
PB -H
Effort -e
Date 1 Government's Ig -(1+,)I,
Investment
Construction cost - x + yi(e)
Date 2 Consumer Surplus S
Renegotiated Ri - R1
Revenue
Debt Service - P P
PB payback H
a 2
The agent's date 1 net payoff = discounted revenue + government reinvestment - capital
shortfall - discounted debt payment + discounted PB payback
I DH
= aR, - x + q(e) + 10 +If + - -aP + -
a a a
The government's date 1 net payoff= discounted consumer surplus - discounted revenue -
government investment valued at the social cost
= Y(S - RI ) - (1+ i5)I
The bank's date 1 net payoff = discounted debt service = 8P
The agent's date 0 net payoff = discounted agent's date 1 net payoff - equity - PB - cost-
reducing effort
= 2-x )+D 2p
The government's date 0 net payoff= discounted consumer surplus - discounted revenue -
government investment valued at the social cost
= 1
2 (S -RI)-y(1+3)If
The bank's date 0 net payoff = discounted debt service - debt = # 2 P - Do
As stated in the beginning of this section, two renegotiation games may be held when
I D0
x >y(e) +--+ occurs:
a a
(1) The renegotiation between the agent and the bank over debt repayment P.
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(2) The renegotiation between the agent and the government over reinvestments and
reenue (I ia, R,) .
There exist interrelations between these two possible renegotiation games: The perspective of the
outcome of the first bargaining game affects the BATNA of the second bargaining game, while
the perspective of the outcome of the second bargaining game affects the BATNA of the first
bargaining game. However, it can be shown that the second bargaining game will not occur
regardless the outcome of the first bargaining game.
Proposition 7: Under the non-recourse debt regime, the agent's strategy is to not renegotiate
with the government over (I , I, R,) when x - q'(e) - - - > 0
a a
occurs.
Proposition 8 shows the necessary and sufficient condition for the renegotiation between the
agent and the bank to occur.
Proposition 8: When the event x - qf (e) - - > 0 occurs:
a a
i. The agent and the bank renegotiate over P if the realized x satisfies:
(a(l+ f) -, xf) I0 Do) H >
x -(j yi(e) +a,±c2 0a,8 a a a2
ii. When the above condition holds, the agent and the bank specify in the
new contract
P = R 0 -A7 x - ql(e) I0 Do + 2
a a 2a
where
_ = + a(1+ f)
2 ap/
Proposition 8 shows that the surplus from the recovering of PB is shared by the agent and the
bank after renegotiation. We can now determine the parties' payoffs with the new contract:
Following proposition 19 an 20 we know there exists no new contract if the realized x satisfies
(Cto~i)-fl) x- (e) Do + H < 0. On the other hand, if the realized x satisfies
a,8 a a a2
(a(I+ f) -)) I D. H
a18 a a a2
The agent's date 1 net payoff with the new contract is:
IDo H
U(New-contrac) 7 - e) - L x) + (3-11)
a a 2a
The banks' date 1 net payoff with the new contract is:
W(New Contract) = P[RO A 7 Xi/(eI0 Dx -+ 2 (3-12)
The government's date I net payoff with the new contract is:
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VI(New _contract) =S - R0) (3-13)
The agent's date 0 net payoff with the new contract is:
~ D0e HUO(New contrac} = A,- 'kf) - 7'0 --- e (3-14)
- a 2
The bank's date 0 net payoff with the new contract is:
WO(New6 contract) 2RO -A x - A(e) - + -1 Do + P2 H (3-15)
- a a 2a
The government's date 0 net payoff with the new contract is:
VO(New contract) 2(S - RO) (3-16)
3.3.2 The Break-even Costs that Separate the Four Scenarios
This section examines the properties of the break-even costs for the non-recourse debt contracts.
Different from the non-PB contracts where the parties' renegotiation decision depends
exclusively on the value of - (1+ f), there exists a break-even cost for renegotiation to occur
a
in PB contracts.
Definition 1: xi is the cost at which the initial capital investment breaks even with the
construction cost:
I D
x, = (e)+--+Do
a a
Definition 2: x2 is the cost at which the agent is indifferent between self-enforcement of the
existing contract or renegotiation of a new contract7 :
I (i 1 1 ___
x 2 = V(e)+ -+ ID0 +- R( + H
a a p 2 A7 ) A7  2a 2A 7
Definition 3: x3 is the cost at which the agent and the bank are indifferent between renegotiating
a new contract or letting the bank take over the project8:
I D0  H
x3 = ql(e) + 1+ Do + H
a a 2a(1- aA7 )
The relationship between a realized construction cost x and the resulting scenario outcome is laid
out as follows:
7 x 2 is derived by letting the agent's self-enforcing payoff equal the agent's new contract payoff:
aRO - x + VI(e) + -+ - Do +- = (aA7 -1 x - y/(e) " D +-
a (a p2, a a a 2a
8 X3 is derived by letting P* = P:
_ oD H _+ _ oD
Ro - x - q(e) 1 o)+ H = RO - I X (-yf(e) 1 o0a a a a 2 1 a a
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(1) x x1 : The initial capital investment is sufficient to cover the construction cost. No
reinvestment is needed to complete the project.
x > x1 : The initial capital investment is insufficient to cover the construction cost.
Reinvestment is needed to complete the project.
(2) x > x 2 : The agent's self-enforcing payoff is smaller than his new contract payoff. The agent
does not make up the shortfall.
x x 2 : The agent's self-enforcing payoff is greater than his new contract payoff. The agent
makes up the shortfall.
(3) If -<I+ f:
a
x > x 3 : The agent's maximal acceptable renegotiated debt payment is greater than the bank's
minimal acceptable renegotiated debt payment (P* > P.). The parties renegotiate a
new contract.
x x3 : The agent' maximal acceptable renegotiated debt payment is smaller than the bank's
minimal acceptable renegotiated debt payment (P* < P) . The bank takes control of
the project.
If ->1+ f:
a
x > x 3 The agent's maximal acceptable renegotiated debt payment is smaller than the bank's
minimal acceptable renegotiated debt payment ((P* < P.) ).The bank takes control of
the project.
x s x 3 : The agent' maximal acceptable renegotiated debt payment is greater than the bank's
minimal acceptable renegotiated debt payment P* > P. The parties renegotiate a new
contract.
Note that the relationship between xi and x 2 and the relationship between x 2 and x 3 are
contract-specific and can be determined by structuring (I0, DO, RO ,H). The relationship between
x, and x3 are project-specific and cannot be determined by structuring (I0, DO , RO H).
Proposition 9: x1 , x 2 and x 3 exhibit the following properties:
(1) x 1 > x 3 if the project exhibits - <I+ f
a
x1 <x 3 if the project exhibits > I+
(2) x 1 = X2
(3) x 2 = X3
D0 Hwhen R Do-- + 2 =0
w 0 p2 2a
when R D (1-2aA7 )H -
p 2 2a 2(1 - aA7 )
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Proposition 9 shows that the participants of the contract can adjust the values of R0 , Do and H to
determine the ordering of x1 , x 2 , and x 3 . It can be easily verified that (1) x, > x 2 if
D0  H D0  HR- 2+ 2<0 (alternatively x <x 2 if R- R + 2 >0),and(3)x 2 >x 3 if
p 2a p 2cx
R + (-2 7)H >0 (alternatively x2 < X3 if R - + (-2aA 7 )H <0).
p2 2a2(1- 3) 2 2a2(1a,
3.3.3 Financial Structure and Contract Type
Given that the values of Do and R0 determine the ordering of (x 1, x 2 , X 3 ) and that the ordering of
(x 1 , x2 , X3 ) determines the possible scenario outcomes that could occur at date 1, the parties can
determine the possible scenario outcomes by devising the financial contract (1 0 , Do, R0 , H).
Proposition 10: For a contract that employs a non-recourse debt control right regime:
(a) If the project exhibits - <1+ f:
a
D0 H
a. For contracts specifying R > - 2 , the possible scenario
p 22a2
outcomes are: no reinvestment, self-enforcement, and new contract.
b. For contracts specifying R0 < 2 _ -,, the possible scenario
p2 2a2
outcomes are: no reinvestment and new contract.
(b) If the project exhibits - > 1 + f:
a
D0 (l-2aA7 )Ha. For contracts specifying R0 > , (1- aA7 )' the possible
p 2 2a2 ( - aA7)
scenario outcomes are: no reinvestment, self-enforcement, and new
agent.
De H D0  (l- 2aA7 )Hb. For contracts specifying - 2 <R0 < , 2 aA 7 ) the
p 2 2a 2 0 2 2a 2(1- aA7
possible scenario outcomes are: no reinvestment, self-enforcement,
new contract and new agent.
D0 H
c. For contracts specifying R0 < a --- , the possible scenario
outcomes are: no reinvestment, new contract, and new agent.
3.3.4 Parties' Expected Payoffs with The Five Contract Types
Once the values of (I, DO , RO ,H) are chosen, the contract type is determined and the parties'
expected payoffs can be calculated. To simplify the notation in writing the parties' payoffs, we let:
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;DeB 9 =a 2 R + (I
BIO = -aA7I 0 +(-aA 7 )DO - H
2
Bi = # 2R0 + 7(I 0 +DO)-Do + )2 H
a 2a2
B 12 =82RO + (I0 +DO)-Do
a
We now define the five possible contract types as follows:
(1) Type N-I contract:
A Type N-I contract is a non-recourse debt contract that has the following three equilibrium
scenario outcomes: No reinvestment, self-enforcement, and new contract. A contract is a
Type I contract if the project exhibits - 1+ f (so x1 > x 3 ) and when the contract specifies
a
D H
01R > 2D -- (thus making x2 > x ). The parties' payoffs with a Type N-I contract arep 2r
shown in Figure 3-5.
No reinvestment Agent: B9 - a(x - y(e)) - e
Bank: )_-
I D 0
Sign (10,DO,RO,H
x: x2  Self-enforcement
x > xc
x > x2 New contract
Government: y2 (S - R0 )
Agent: B9 -a(x - (e)) - e
Bank: p 
- 1 D0
Government: y 2 (S - R)
Agent: B10 +a(aA7 -lXx-w(e))-e
Bank: B - /J2 A7(x-,(e))
Government: y 2 ( R0 )
Figure 3-5 The parties' payoffs with a Type N-I contract
The agent's date 0 expected payoff with a Type N-I contract is:
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&
x2 (e)
EUO(TypeN-I) _ (2A,(e)+B9 -Bjo)(x 2 (e))-a xxdF(x)
X (3-17)
+a(aA7 -1) xdP(x)-a(rA7 -1)qpe)+BjO -e
x2(e)
The bank's date 0 expected payoff with a Type N-I contract is:
EW(TypeN-I) = 2 A, 7 (e)+ - ID -B 1 F(x2(e))
-1) 82(3-18)
-P2 A7 JxdF(x) + / 2A 7 (e) + B11
x2(e)
The government's date 0 payoff with a Type N-I contract is 72 (S - R0 ) with certainty. For
the parties to agree on a Type N-I contract, the contract must satisfy: EUO(Type N-1) 0 ,
EW(Type N-I) > 0 , and S RO .
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(2) Type N-Il contract:
A Type N-II contract is a non-recourse debt contract that has the following two equilibrium
scenario outcomes: No reinvestment and new contract. A contract is a Type N-II contract if
the project exhibits - 1+ f (so x3 x3 ) and when the contract specifies RO D H
a 0 p2 2a 2
(thus making x, > x2 ). The parties' payoffs with a Type N-II contract are shown in Figure 3-
6.
X X No reinvestment
Sign (I, D0 ,ROH)
> X1 New contract
Agent: B 9 - (x -y (e)) - e
Bank: 
-_ D
Government: y2(S - R0 )
Agent: B10 +a (aA 7 - l)x - y/(e)) - e
Bank: B 1 _ 2 A 7 (x - (e))
Government: y2(S - R0 )
Figure 3-6 The parties' payoffs with a Type N-II contract
The agent's date 0 expected payoff with a Type N-II contract is:
xF(e)
EUO(Type N-I) __a 2 A,7(e)+B, -BIO)F(x,(e))-a fxdF(x)
(3-19)
+ a(aA7 -1d xdF(x) -V(e) + Bio - e
The bank's date 0 expected payoff with a Type N-II contract is:
EWO(TypeN-II) 8 2 1 D -_ #2A7(e)-B F(x,(e))
(3-20)
-# 2A7 JxdF(x)+82A q(e)+ B
xi (e)
The government's date 0 payoff with a Type N-II contract is V2(S - R0 ) with certainty. For
the parties to agree on a Type N-II contract, the contract must satisfy: EUO(Type N-II) > 0
EWO(Type N-1) 0 , and S RO I
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(3) Type N-III contract:
A Type N-III contract is a non-recourse debt contract that has the following three equilibrium
scenario outcomes: No reinvestment, self-enforcement, and new agent. A contract is a Type
N-III contract if the project exhibits 8 > 1+ f (so x1 <x 3 ) and when the contract specifies
a
Rp > 2 (- aA) (thus making x2 > X3 ). The parties' payoffs with a Type N-Ill
contpr 2a w - aA 3)
contract are shown in Figure 3-7.
Agent: B 9 -a(x - yi(e)) - e
No reinvestment
Bank: # 2
(P 2
1 D 0
Sign (Io, Do, ROH
X < X 3 Self-enforcement
x > x1
X 3 New agent
Government: y 2(S - R0 )
Agent: B 9 -a(x - (e)) - e
Bank: 
-
21 Do
Government: 2 (S - R0)
Agent: -10 -H-e
Bank: B2 -A('+)(x-Y(e))
Government: 7
2 (S -R)+H
Figure 3-7 The parties' payoffs with a Type N-Ill contract
The agent's date 0 expected payoff with a Type N-III contract is:
x3(e)
EUO(Type N -III) [ + H ± B9 Fx(e))- a fxdF(x) - - H - e
The bank's date 0 expected payoff with a Type N-III contract is:
EWO(Type N-IH) = p(l+ f)vd(e)+ AL -l1JDo - B12 F(x3 (e))
-8(1+ f)JxdF(x) - i/(e) + B12
X3 (e)
The government's date 0 expected payoff with Type N-III contract is:
(3-21)
(3-22)
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EVO(Type N-III) --:2 (S - R0 ) + - (1- F(x 3 (e)))H
a
(3-23)
For the parties to agree on a Type N-III contract (1o, DO, RO, ,H) the contract must satisfy
both EU(Type N-III) 0, EW(Type N-III) 0, and E VO(TYP N-III) 0.
(4) Type N-IV contract:
A Type N-IV contract is a non-recourse debt contract that has the following four equilibrium
scenario outcomes: No reinvestment, self-enforcement, new contract, and new agent. A
contract is a Type N-IV contract if the project exhibits >1+ f (so x1 <x 3 ) and when the
a
D0  H D (-2A)
contract specifies -- -- < RO < D - 2aA?)H (thus making x3 > X2 > x,). The
p2  2a 2  p 2a 2(1 - aA7)
parties' payoffs with a Type N-IV contract are shown in Figure 3-8.
X:! x No reinvestment
Sign (I ,DO, R0  X X Self-enforcement
X><; X New contract
x > x
X > x3 New agent
Agent: B 9 -a(x- y(e)) -e
Bank: (T-l) D
Government: 2(S - R0 )
Agent: B 9 - a(x - V (e)) - e
Bank: 
-1 D
Government: 2(S - R0 )
Agent: B10 +a(aA7 -Xx-y(e))-e
Bank: B1 -1 2 A 7 (x - I(e))
Government: r 2 (S - R0 )
Agent: -1I -H-e
Bank: B2 -Ul+f)(x-y (e))
Government: 72(S -R )+Y H
a
Figure 3-8 The parties' payoffs with a Type N-IV contract
The agent's date 0 expected payoff with a Type N-IV contract is:
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EUO(TypeN-I) :-( 2A y(e)+B -BjO)(x 2(e))+[a(1-aA7 )y(e)+IO +H+BIO]F(x 3(e))
x2(e) x3(e)
-a xdf(x)+afA 7 -1) fxdT(x)-Io -H -e
x x2 (e)
The bank's date 0 expected payoff with a Type N-IV contract is:
EWO(TypeN-IV)
(3-24)
( ~ 2
_ 
2 A 7 y(e)+ ( -1)DO -B IJF(x2 (e))+ [,(3 7 -f -1)y(e)+Bl1 -B 12 ]F(x3(e))P
x3 (e)
-#82 A, JxdF(x) -,6(1 +f) JxdPx) +p6(1 +f)q/(e) + B12
x2 (e) x3 (e)
(3-25)
The government's date 0 expected payoff with a Type N-IV contract is:
EVO(Type N-IV) 2(S - R )+ Y (1 - F(x, (e)))H (3-26)
a
For the parties to agree on a Type N-IV contract, the contract must satisfy EUO(Type N-IV) !0 ,
EW(Type N-IV) 0, and EVO(Type N-IV) 0 .
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(5) Type N-V contract:
A Type N-V contract is a non-recourse debt contract that has the following three equilibrium
scenario outcomes: No reinvestment, new contract, and new agent. A contract is a Type N-V
contract if the project exhibits >1+ f (so x1 <x 3 ) and when the contract specifies
a
D H
R<- - -2a2 (thus making x > x 2 ). The parties' payoffs with a Type N-V contract arep 2r
shown in Figure 3-9.
x < x1  No reinvestment
Sign (10,DO,RO,H)
X> x3 New contract
x > x1
x > x3 New agent
Agent: B9 -a(x - g(e)) - e
Bank: 
_- 1 ) D 0
Government: ;V2 (S - R0 )
Agent: B10 +a(aA7 -1)(x - I/(e))-e
Bank: B 1 - 2 7 (x-/(e))
Government: y 2(S - Rn)
Agent: -I0 -H-e
Bank: B 2 -A'+f)(x - I(e))
Government: 72(S -R,,)+ H
a
Figure 3-9 The parties' payoffs with a Type N-V contract
The agent's date 0 expected payoff with a Type N-V contract is:
EU(TypeN-V) = (a2Ay/(e) + B9 - BIO)F(xl (e)) + [a( - aA7V(e) + 10 + H + BIO]F(x3 (e))
x, (e) x3 (e)
- a jxdF(x) + aaA7 -1) fxdF(x) -1I - H - e
x x1(e)
(3-27)
The bank's date 0 expected payoff with a Type N-V contract is:
= 
2 A 7W(e) + - 1 D -B 1 F(xl (e))
+ [(pOA7 - f - 1)V(e) + B 1 - B 2 ]F(x3 (e))
X3 (e) 00
- ,
2 A7  xdF(x) - 6(1 + f) JxdF(x)+ /3(1 +
x,(e) x3 (e)
(3-28)
f)y/(e) + B12
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EWO(Type N-V)
The government's date 0 expected payoff with a Type N-V contract is:
EVO(Type NV) 2 (S - R )+ Y (I - F(x, (e)))H (3-29)
a
For parties to agree on a Type N-V contract, the contract must satisfy EU(Type N-V) > 0 ,
EWO(TypeN-V) 0, and EVO(Type N-V) 0 .
3.3.5 Agent's optimal cost-reducing effort
By now we know that there exist five contract types when the contract employs a non-recourse
debt control right regime. In this sub-section we examine the effect of financial structure over the
agent's optimal cost-reducing effort. We will show (1) which contract type induces higher level
of cost-reduce effort, and (2) whether the agent's cost-reducing effort increases or decreases with
the level of performance bond under a given initial capital investment.
Using backward induction, we calculate the agent's optimal cost-reducing effort under each
contract type by differentiating the agent's date 0 expected utility with respect to e.
(1) Type N-I contract
The agent's optimal cost-reducing effort for a Type N-I contract satisfies the first order
condition:
8EUO(Type N-I) = a[l - aA 7 (1- F(x 2(e))}f'(e) -1 = 0 (3-30)
ae
The term (1 - aA, (1 - F(x2 (e)))) represents the hold-up effect. It is the weighted marginal
gain from the agent's cost-reducing effort in the No reinvestment, Self-enforcement, and New
contract scenarios. We know Vx > x2 the agent's gain from cost-reduction will be shared
with the government in the ex post bargaining game so his gain is discounted.
(2) Type N-II contract
The agent's optimal cost-reducing effort for a Type N-II contract satisfies the first order
condition:
aEUO(TypeNJ 
- (1-aA,(l-F(,(e))))+ a%- a D+ Hf(x(e)) (e)-1=0 (3-31)
The term (1- aA7 (1- F(xl (e)))) represents the hold-up effect. It is the weighted marginal
gain from the agent's cost-reducing effort in the No reinvestment and New contract scenarios.
We know Vx > xi the agent's gain from cost-reduction will be shared with the government in
the ex post bargaining game so his gain is discounted.
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( itThe second term aRo -2a D +- H f(x1 (e))is the marginal gain the agent gets from an
p is 2an t
adjustment in the revenue in the New Contract scenario. For R0 - 2Do + is negative
p 2a'
in Type N-II contracts, the low revenue (and the low performance bond as well) essentially
post as a disincentive for the agent to make efforts. In other words, the agent exerts lower
level of effort for a low revenue contract with a hope to increase the revenue through ex post
renegotiation.
(3) Type N-III contract
The agent's optimal cost-reducing effort for a Type N-III contract satisfies the first order
condition:
aEUO(ype N-If) = a F(x 3(e))+ Ro -1 Do + (1-2aA7) H f(x, (e)) }f'(e) -1 = 0 (3-32)
ae IP 2a (1 - aA7)) I
The first term F(x3 (e)) represents the hold-up effect. It is the weighted marginal gain from
the agent's cost-reducing effort in the No reinvestment, Self-enforcement, and New agent
scenarios. Obviously Vx x 3 the agent gets the full fruit of his investment in the New Agent
and Self-enforcement scenarios, Vx > x 3 the agent's gain from cost-reduction will be simply
equal to 0 in the New Agent scenario.
The second term Ro 2 D o +  (122aA7 ) H f(x 3 (e)) is the marginal gain of cost-
p 2a 2 (1 -aA 7) )
reducing effort that the agent gets from a New Agent scenario. Since
D(1 -2aA7 )HR -D + ( 2a ) > 0 in a Type N-III contract, the high revenue (and the high0p 22a 2(l- aA7)
performance bond as well) essentially post as an incentive for the agent to make efforts to
deter the occurrence of the New Agent scenario.
(4) Type N-IV contract
The agent's optimal cost-reducing effort for a Type N-IV contract satisfies the first order
condition:
EUO(TYpeN-I) = a[F(x3 W)+aA7(F(x2(e))-F(x3(e)))](e)-1=0 (3-33)
The term F(x3 (e)) + aA 7 (F(x2 (e)) - F(x3 (e)))represents the hold-up effect. It is the
weighted sum of the agent's share of gains in the No Investment, Self-enforcement, and New
Contract scenarios.
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The second term a 2 A, (F(x2 (e)) - F(x, (e))) represents the hold-up effect over the marginal
gain from the agent's cost-reducing effort in the New Contract scenario. Since
F(x2 ) < F(x3 ) in a Type N-IV contract, this term imposes a disincentive for the agent to
make efforts.
(4) Type N-V contract
The agent's optimal cost-reducing effort for a Type N-V contract satisfies the first order
condition:
EUO(TypeN-V) = F(x 3 (e))+aA (F(x1 (e))-F(x3 (e)))+ aRo - Do + I(e) (e)-1=0
Pe 2 2a,(
(3-34)
The term F(x3 (e)) + aA7 (F(x2 (e)) - F(x3 (e)))represents the hold-up effect. It is the
weighted sum of the agent's share of gains in the No Investment and New Contract scenarios.
The third term aR - a D + 1 H f(x (e)) is the marginal gain the agent gets from an0p 2  02a )
1 H
adjustment in the revenue in the New Contract scenario. For RO 2 Do + 2 is negative
p 2a
in Type N-V contracts, the low revenue (and the low performance bond as well) essentially
post as a disincentive for the agent to make efforts. In other words, the agent exerts lower
level of effort for a low revenue contract with a hope to increase the revenue through ex post
renegotiation.
Equation (3-30), (3-31), (3-32), (3-33) and (3-34) show that the financial structure as well as the
distribution of x affect the agent's optimal choice of e. Note that if the agent firmly believes that
the initial capital investment is sufficient to cover the construction cost (so f(x) = 0,
F(x) = F(x2 ) = 1), the agent's optimal efforts in all of the five types of contract all satisfy
1
qi'(e) = -. In other words, the agent exerts first best efforts in all contract types.
a
It can be shown that Type N-I and Type N-II contracts exhibit the following monotone properties:
Proposition 11: When the project involves proprietary technology (- < 1 + f ), for any given
a
initial capital investment 7r e , the order of the agent's optimal cost-reducing
effort is eTypeN eype -II
It can also be shown that Type N-III, Type N-IV and Type N-II contracts exhibit the following
monotone properties:
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Proposition 12: When the project involves competitive technology ( > 1 + f ), for any
a
given initial capital investment nr e r, the order of the agent's optimal cost-
reducing effort is: eTypeN-I > ypeN-IV ypeN-V
3.3.6 Financial Structure and Agent's Effort Incentive
We now assume that at date 0 the parties set the initial capital investment at a fixed value
10 +Do = 7 , where r satisfies ir e - = [DO,S]. The three decision variable are RO, DO , and
H (10 is determined by 10 = z - DO). With the introduction of ;, we can rewrite x, x 2 , x 3 ,
B10, B11and B12 as follows:
x1 = y/(e) +
a
z Do RO H
x2 =?L(e)+±
a p2 A7  A7  2a 2A 7
7r H
a 2a(l--aA7 )
H
B10 = -aA71r +Do - 2
B 1 = #2 RO + A7 - Do +8 H
a) 2a
B12 = P2 + p( + ) - Do
a
We will now compare the agent's optimal efforts in Type N-I to Type N-V contracts under a
given initial capital investment.
Proposition 13: For any given initial capital investment ;r e ir, the agent's optimal cost-
reducing effort (1) decreases with the level of debt, and (2) increases with the
level of the performance bond in Type N-I, N-II, N-IV, and N-V contracts.
Given that the agent's optimal cost reducing effort in Type N-III contract is a function of f(x 3 ),
we cannot verify the effect of performance bond over the agent's cot-reducing effort without
further specifying the property of f(x 3 ).
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3.4 Numerical Example
Given the cost uncertainty embedded in our model, it is not possible to derive analytical solutions
for the agent's optimal effort in each type of contract. Here we use a numerical example to
demonstrate the effect of financial structure over the agent's optimal effort and the parties'
expected payoffs. It can be shown that while the agent's optimal cost-reducing effort exhibits a
monotone property (it generally decreases with the magnitude of debt and increases with the
magnitude of the performance bond), the parties' expected payoff do that possess these monotone
properties. In most contract types the agent's expected payoff increases with the magnitude of
debt and decreases with the magnitude of the performance, whereas the control right owner's
expected payoff decreases with debt and increases with the performance bond.
3.4.1 Full-recourse Debt
The parameters and input we have for the full-recourse debt contract is as follows:
r, = 0.14 so a = 0.877193
rb = 0.08 so 8 = 0.925926
rg = 0.04 so y = 0.961538
r, = 0.12 so p = 0.892857
f = 0.3, o = 0.3 , I + Do = 80, H = -20
a-1 b 1
Distribution (Gamma distribution): so pdf is f(x)= x e and cdf is ta-leb dt .(use
b"F(a) b"F(a)f
a=5, b=10)
By assumption y/'(e) > 0 and yq'(e) < 0 so we use y'(e) = In e.
(1) Type F-I contract: (condition: the contract specifies R > A5Do - 2a + H)
2a y
For D e [0,80], R = 110 satisfies R0 > AD- (a + y) H DO=80,H=0 =105.04352a y
Figure 3-10 shows that the agent's optimal effort decreases with the magnitude of debt and
increases with the magnitude of the performance bond (though not very sensitive).
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UeIt
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Fig 3-10 The agent's optimal effort with a F-I contract
Figure 3-11 shows that the agent's expected payoff increases with the magnitude of debt and
decreases with the magnitude of the performance bond (though not very sensitive).
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Fig 3-11 The agent's expected utility with a F-I contract
Figure 3-12 shows that the government's expected payoff decreases with the magnitude of debt
and increases with the magnitude of the performance bond (though not very sensitive).
60
LL
01)
CL
-F5
E
0n
,4-
C)
CD
U-
0- 37
3 6
-35,
C-)
'C
E 32E. .U-- --- - - --
> 80 .. . -- ----
60 20
40 .15
20 5 10
Debt 0 0 Performance Bond
Fig 3-12 The government's expected utility with a F-I contract
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(2) Type F-II contract: (condition: the contract specifies R0 < A5 DO - 2a H)2a y
For D e [70,80], R0 = 75 satisfies, R0 <A 5D 0 - 2rH DA=70,H=O =79.5042a 2 y
Figure 3-13 shows that the agent's optimal effort decreases with the magnitude of debt and
increases with the magnitude of the performance.
0.82 ..
b 0.78 .---
C
C,
0.74 .. ----
C> 0.72 - ---
< 80
20
-- 10
Debt 70 0 Performance Bond
Fig 3-13 The agent's optimal effort with a F-II contract
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Figure 3-14 shows that the agent's expected payoff increases with the magnitude of debt and
decreases with the magnitude of the performance bond.
75 - . 15
- 10
D bt70 0U Performance Bond
Fig 3-14 The agent's expected utility with a F-II contract
Figure 3-15 shows that the government's expected payoff decreases with the magnitude of debt
and increases with the magnitude of the performance bond.
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Fig 3-15 The government's expected utility with a F-II contract
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U- 201s
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CD
a,
0)
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3.4.2 Non-recourse Debt
Parameter and input
r, = 0.14 so a = 0.877193
rb = 0.08 so 8 = 0.925926
rg = 0.04 so y= 0.961538
rr = 0.12 so P= 0. 8 9 2 8 5 7
f = 0.3, o = 0.3 , I +Do = 80, H =I~ 20
x
xale a- ba~aDistribution (Gamma distribution): so pdf is f(x) = r,( , and cdf is a t"le dt.(use
ba=5a) b"F(a)
a=5, b=10)
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(1) Type N-I contract: (conditions: the project exhibits - 1+ f , and the contract
a
specifies R0 > Do H
-
2)p 2a
f=0.3 satisfies -=1.0556 <1+ f =1.3
a
D0 HFor D e [0,80], R0 = 100 satisfies R0 > - 2 =80H=O = 98.922p 2  2a 2
Figure 3-16 shows that the agent's optimal effort decreases with the magnitude of debt and
increases with the magnitude of the performance bond (though not very sensitive).
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Fig 3-16 The agent's optimal effort with a N-I contract
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Figure 3-17 shows that the agent's expected payoff increases with the magnitude of debt and
decreases with the magnitude of the performance bond (though not very sensitive).
37-
36-
35,
34-
33-
32
80
60 20
40 . .. 15
20 5
0 0
Performance BondDebt
Fig 3-17 The agent's expected utility with a N-I contract
Figure 3-18 shows that the bank's expected payoff increases with the magnitude of debt and
also increases with the magnitude of the performance bond (though not very sensitive).
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Fig 3-18 The bank's expected utility with a N-I contract
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(2) Type N-II contract: (conditions: the project exhibits -- 1+ f , and the contract
a
specifiesR < Do- H0p 2 2)p 2a
For D e [70,80], R0 = 80 satisfies R0  ! D7H H 81.310 0 0 p2  2a 2 1D0=70,H=1O
Figure 3-19 shows that the agent's optimal effort decreases with the magnitude of debt and
increases with the magnitude of the performance bond.
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Fig 3-19 The agent's optimal effort with a N-II contract d
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Figure 3-20 shows that the agent's expected payoff increases with the magnitude of debt and
decreases with the magnitude of the performance bond.
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Fig 3-20 The agent's expected utility with a N-II contract
Figure 3-21 shows that the bank's expected payoff increases with the magnitude of debt and
also increases with the magnitude of the performance bond.
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Fig 3-21 The bank's expected utility with a N-II contract
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(3) Type N-III contract: (conditions: the project exhibits -- > 1+ f , and the contract specifies
a
Do (1 - 2aA7)H
p 2  2a 2 (1 - aA7 )
f=0.03 satisfies -=1.0556 >1+ f =1.03
ar
(applying to the next 2 cases as well)
D0 (1-2aA7)HFor D e [0,10], R0 = 550 satisfies R0 > - ( 2a D=1O,H=1O= 536.34p2  2a 2 (1- aA7 )
Figure 3-22 shows that the agent's optimal effort decreases with the magnitude of debt
(though not sensitive) and increases with the magnitude of the performance bond.
a-
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Fig 3-22 The agent's optimal effort with a N-III contract
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Debt
Figure 3-23 shows that the agent's expected payoff increases with the magnitude of debt
(though not sensitive) and decreases with the magnitude of the performance bond.
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Fig 3-23 The agent's expected utility with a N-III contract
Figure 3-24 shows that the bank's expected utility increases with the magnitude of debt
(though not sensitive) and also increases with the magnitude of the performance bond.
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Fig 3-24 The bank's expected utility with a N-III contract
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Figure 3-25 shows that the government's expected payoff decreases with the magnitude of
debt and increases with the magnitude of the performance bond.
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Fig 3-25 The government's expected utility with a N-Ill contract
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(4) Type N-IV contract (conditions: the project exhibits - > 1+ f , and the contract
a
Do H Do (1- 2aA7)H
specifies-- 2a2 < R < (1-aA7 )p2 2a2p2 2a 2 (l-aA7)
For Do e [0,10], R0 =100 satisfies
D H D
- 2 Do80,H0 =12.544< R <-y
p0 2a 2 1D 8,=P2
( 2a 7 )H DO=,H=10 523.795
2a (1-aA7 )
Figure 3-26 shows that the agent's optimal effort decreases with the magnitude of debt
(though not sensitive) and increases with the magnitude of the performance bond.
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Fig 3-26 The agent's optimal effort with a N-IV contract
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Figure 3-27 shows that the agent's expected payoff increases with the magnitude of debt and
decreases with the magnitude of the performance bond.
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Fig 3-27 The agent's expected utility with a N-IV contract
Figure 3-28 shows that the bank's expected payoff increases with the magnitude of debt and
decreases with the magnitude of the performance bond.
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Fig 3-28 The bank's expected utility with a N-IV contract
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Figure 3-29 shows that the government's expected payoff decreases with the magnitude of
debt (though not sensitive).
z 12
10,
a.
> 0
Debt 0Performance Bond
Fig 3-29 The government's expected utility with a N-IV contract
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(5) Type N-V contract (conditions: the project exhibits - > 1+ f , and the contract
a
Do H
specifies R <D 
---
pD 2a
For D e [70,80], R0 = 80 satisfies R < D0  H81310 0 0 p2  2a 2 D0=70,H=10
Figure 3-30 shows that the agent's optimal effort decreases with the magnitude of debt and
increases with the magnitude of the performance bond.
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Fig 3-30 The agent's optimal effort with a N-V contract
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Figure 3-31 shows that the agent's expected payoff increases with the magnitude of debt and
decreases with the magnitude of the performance bond.
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Fig 3-31 The agent's expected utility with a N-V contract
Figure 3-32 shows that the bank's expected payoff increases with the magnitude of debt and
decreases with the magnitude of the performance bond (though not sensitive).
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Fig 3-32 The bank's expected utility with a N-V contract
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Figure 3-33 shows that the government's expected payoff increases with the magnitude of
debt and increases with the magnitude of the performance bond.
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Fig 3-33 The government's expected utility with a N-V contract
77
Chapter 4 Case Study: The Taiwan High-Speed Rail Project
In this chapter I relate theoretical results I derive from chapter 3 to real world practice by
examining the financial contract of the Taiwan High Speed Rail (THSR) project. The THSR
contract is a typical PPP contract with a financial structure very similar to the one I consider in
my theoretical model. However, given the huge scale of the project, the financing of the project
has been divided into multiple stages (as opposed to the one shot financing structure we consider
in our simple model). This sequential financing structure gives rise to severe hold-up and buy-in
problems.
4.1 The THSR Project
The Taiwan High-Speed Rail (THSR) project is a USD 15B high-speed rail system that provides
transport service to Taiwan's western corridor, where 94 percents of the island's 23 million
people live. THSR is a 220-mile rail system that operates at a speed of 186 mph with a passenger
volume of 150,000 passengers per day. The construction of the project started on December 1999,
and was scheduled to complete October 2005. As of the end of 2006, the project has not yet
completed as planned.
In early 1990's, the government of Taiwan started planning the development of a high-speed rail
system in the island's western corridor. In Sep 1997, The Taiwan High Speed Rail Consortium
(THSRC), founded by five domestic companies (hereafter the parent firms), outbid the Chinese
Development Consortium by promising to pay USD 3.1 B to the government in the end of the
railway concession. In return, THSRC is awarded a contract that includes a 35-year high-speed
railway concession and a 50-year land development concession.
With the USD 15B capital investment, THSR is the largest Build-Operate-Transfer project in the
world. The contract specifies that the government will finance 21% of the construction cost (USD
3.1 B), whereas the remaining 79% (USD 11.99B) will be financed with private funding. Within
private funding, it is specified that 69% of the private funding (USD 8.23B) will be financed with
debt, whereas the remaining 31% (USD 3.76B) will be financed with equity from THSRC.
Furthermore, the contract demands that the 5 parent firms of THSRC should account for at least
51% of equity, institutional investors should account for 29-34% of equity, and the remaining 12-
20% equity can be raised from public offering in the local stock market. In addition, a USD 0.5B
performance bond is required to guarantee the realization of the project. Due to the huge scale of
the project, the contract specifies a multi-phase financing schedule.
(Stage 1) November 1997
Plan: At this stage, a capital investment of USD 9.7B (80% of total capital investment) should be
in place. Among the USD 9.7B capital investment, USD 8.23B (100% of total debt) should
be in debt, and the remaining USD 1.47B (40% of total equity) should be in equity.
Result:
Debt financing:
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After encountering difficulties in deriving debt funding from both local and foreign banks,
THSRC filed a USD 8.23B loan application to the Council for Economic Planning and
Development (CEPD) by resorting to the Construction and Operation Agreement (C&OA)
in the contract, which states: "The government should assist THSRC in applying for mid-
term to long-term funds with the supports from CEPD."
After renegotiation, CEPD agreed to deposit USD 6.18B of postal funds (which accounts
for 75% of the USD 8.23 debt) into 25 banks, which in turn lent a 6.18B syndicate loan to
THSRC with the postal funds as the mortgage. Since the syndicate debt is directly secured
by the government's postal fund, the debt contract specifies a "forced buyout and
government takeover" clause that entitles the government the control rights of the project
upon default. This provision makes the syndicate debt a full-recourse debt. The government
also agreed that the remaining USD 2.05B debt could be raised in stage 2 (in the original
plan, there is actually no stage 2).
Equity financing:
THSRC also renegotiated equity investment with the government. After renegotiation,
among the USD 1.47B equity that was due to be raised at this phase, 16% of the equity
funding (USD 253M) came from the government, while the remaining 84% of the equity
funding (USD 1.23B) came from the 5 parent firms.
(Stage 2) December 1999
Plan: At this stage, a USD 2.05B debt (25% of total debt) was to be secured from foreign banks.
Result:
THSRC remained unable to elicit the USD 2.05B debt (25 % of total debt) from foreign
banks in spite of the backing of 6.18B debt (75 % of total debt) secured in the first stage.
The Japan bullet train system (Shinkansen), formerly a member of the Chinese
Development Consortium, was outbid in the bidding phase. After THSRC experienced
difficulties in securing the USD 2.05B loan, Shinkansen approached THSRC with a
proposal that offered THSRC the assistances to get the USD 2.05B export loan (about 85%
of the core system contract fee) from the Export-Import Bank of Japan (EIBJ, later became
Japan Bank for International Cooperation), and promised to invest at least 10% of the equity
of THSRC.
Shihkansan's proposal gained them the core system contract. However, the change of the
core system contractor entailed a lawsuit from the Euro Train Group, who was a member of
THSRC's joint venture and an incumbent contractor for the core system. It eventually cost
THSRC USD 20M to settle this lawsuit.
After Shihkansan gained the core system contract, THSRC remained unable to derive the
loans from EIBJ due to some strict terms EIBJ imposed on this project. Under such
condition, THSRC again turned to CEPD for more aids on loan. After negotiation, CEPD
agreed to install another USD 882M pension funds in the 25 banks as the source of another
USD 882M syndicate loan. The 25 banks then approved the remaining USD 1.176B loan to
THSRC without the backing of any government funds.
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At this phase, THSRC completed the required debt financing by deriving 86% of the loan
from the government, and 14% of the loan from the 25 local banks - a big deviation from
the original plan which specifies a 75 % loan from local banks, and 25% loan from foreign
banks.
(Stage 3) December 2002 and onwards
Plan: THSRC was to secure the remaining equity investment of USD 2.3 B to complete the
project.
Result:
Starting from December 2002, THSRC launched a sequence of public offerings for its
convertible, preferred stocks. The features of this convertible preferred stock are: (1) a
promised 5% yearly interest rate, but without the right to vote. (2) Without the right to get
dividends. (3) Period: six year, but can be extended to 7 years and 1 month (4) After
possessing this convertibles for three years, the investors can choose to convert the stocks to
common stock, but they will lose the predetermined, promised 5% interest rate. It is
perceived that private financial institutions, insurance companies, and government-owned
institutions are prospective stockholders.
To promote the market's interests in THSRC's public offering, the government revised the
Statute for the Encouragement of Private Participation in Major Transportation Projects
(SEPP) be adding the following terms: " For those entities/people who hold the stocks of
domestic major transportation projects or significant infrastructures for more than two years,
these entities/people can claim 20% of their investments as deductibles from taxable income,
starting from year 2."
The company aimed to attract USD 0.54B of equity by the end of 2002. Due to the tax
incentive created by the government, the convertible, preferred stock offering attracted USD
0.79B of investment by January 2003, which is USD 0.25B higher than the original target.
In the subsequent public offerings, THSRC managed to raise the required USD 2.3 B equity
from the local stock market.
As of May 2005, THSRC reported a forecasted cost overrun of USD 1.5B. On October 2005, two
government agencies invested USD 0.2B to THSRC in the form of equity. On July 2006, THSRC
secured the remaining capital by signing a syndicate loan of USD 1.3 B from 7 local banks.
As of the end of 2006, the construction cost has increased from USD 15B to USD 16.5B and the
project is 1 year behind schedule. In terms of equity funding, 27% is from the 5 parent firms,
19% is from the government, and 54% is from institutional investors and the general public. In
terms of debt, 86% is from the government and 14% is from the 25 banks. The initial financial
plan and the resulting financial structure are shown in table 4-1.
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Table 4-1 The planned and the resulting financing sources of THSR
Debt
(USD 8.23B)
Government
Local banks
Foreign Banks
Plan
0
75%
25%
Result
86%
14%
0
Government 0 18.86%
Equity 5 parent firms 51% 27%
(USD 3.76B) Institutional investors and 49% 54%general public
Source: Lin, J.S. (2003)
4.2 Analysis of the THSR contract
I proceed with my analysis with two different approaches. In the first approach, I analyze
THRC's financial contract using my theoretical model. In the second approach, I discuss all the
possible agency problems underlying this contractual relationship in a descriptive manner.
(1) Analysis based on the theoretical model
The unique feature of the THRC project is the continuous increase of the government's financial
investment in the project after each round of renegotiation. We have shown in proposition 1 that
when the social cost of public fund is low, the government will make up the capital shortfall in
the event of default. More specifically, the government reinvests if - > 1+ (or a+ > 1 +).
a I+ r
It is known that the tax rate in Taiwan is about 19%. The average interest rate for Taiwan
government's 10 year bond is about 2-2.5%. For the government to reinvest, it must be that that
the cost of capital of THSRC exceeds 21%. This value is certainly high in the standard of
corporate cost of capital. However, for a project that involves a development cost much greater
than the sum of the 5 parent firm's prior-to-THRC market value, it is highly likely that the cost of
capital for this specific project has substantially changed the parent firms' costs of capital.
The high cost of capital for THSRC may come from the high uncertainties on both the cost side
and the revenue side of the underlying project. The fact that THSRC was not able to derive loans
from both local and foreign banks without government-backing mortgage has shown the
participants' strong concern about the substantial amount of risks underlying this project. As a
result, the interest rate for the loan that can be offered to THSRC is unacceptably high..
On the other hand, the fact that the government is willing to renegotiate the financial structure
even before the project started signaled a strong buy-in effect, which leads to further distortion in
subsequent renegotiation. In other words, the opportunity cost of public funds may be lower in
real terms than in nominal term such that government reinvestment is justified even with a
moderate cost of capital for THSRC.
(2) Other agency issues
There are other factors that may result in this buy-in phenomenon.
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(i) Political factors:
The THSR project is a highly political sensitive project. The population in Taiwan is
historically well distributed along the west corridor of the island. It is generally believed
that the high speed rail project will help industries move jobs to rural areas. Therefore
voters, especially rural area voters, are concerned about the realization of the project. The
government therefore has a high political stake in the project.
(ii) Macroeconomic factors:
Taiwan's economy plunged from an average annual growth rate of 6-7% to an annual
growth rate of 3-4% starting from year 2000. A key measure the government pursues to
counter economic meltdown and the rising unemployment is by increasing public expense
in infrastructure development. The government agent CEPD estimates that the
construction of THSR has created 480,000 jobs and may contribute 1 percentage point to
annual economic growth. A termination of the project will hurt the already sluggish
economy.
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Chapter 5 Summary and Future Research Directions
The objective of this research is to establish the functional relationship between financial
structure and agent's effort incentive in the realm of PPP contracting. In this chapter I summarize
my major findings and discuss each determinant factor's effect over the agent's effort incentive. I
suggest how this research can be applied to PPP contract design and suggest further reach
directions.
5.1 Research Summary
Here are the major findings from the theoretical analysis.
(1) Financial structure and the possible scenario outcomes (contract types)
I show that ex ante capital structure and control rights regime jointly determine the possible
equilibrium outcomes that can occur (the agent's effort level and the uncertainty of cost doesn't
matter). This phenomenon is inferred from Proposition 3 and Proposition 9 which state that the
ordering of the break-even costs that separate the four scenarios are determined exclusively by
capital structure and control rights regime. As a result, this property also holds when the effect of
the agent's cost-reducing effort is uncertain.
(2) The agent's investment strategy
The agent's optimal cost-reducing effort is determined by a hold-up factor and a self-enforcement
factor. The former acts as a strict disincentive to the agent's effort, whereas the latter can be an
incentive or a disincentive to the agent's effort depending on the capital structure of the contract.
I show that the concern of held-up results in the agent's effort being multiplying by a weight sum
of the agent's share of gain in each specific scenario outcomes. On the other hand, the self-
enforcement effect is characterized by the relative value of revenue and performance bond with
respect to debt. A high revenue to debt ratio (and also a high performance bond to debt ratio)
creates a high power incentive, whereas a low revenue to debt ratio (and also a low performance
bond to debt ratio) creates a low power incentive. The revenue and the performance bond are
essentially substitutes in the formulation of the self-enforcement effect.
(3) The effect of debt
I show that for any given initial capital investment, the agent's optimal cost-reducing effort
decreases with the magnitude of debt in all full-recourse debt and non-recourse debt contract
types. This phenomenon holds when there exhibits one unique solution for the agent's optimal
effort.
(4) The effect of performance bond
I show that for any given initial capital investment, the agent's optimal cost-reducing effort
increases with the magnitude of a performance bond when the contract is one with no positive
self-enforcement effect. This phenomenon holds when there exhibits one unique solution for the
agent's optimal effort.
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(5) The effect of technology
I show that in a full-recourse debt contract the type of technology doesn't directly affect the
possible equilibrium outcomes, instead it only affects the agent's payoff in the renegotiation
game (for technology determines the new agent's cost, which in turn determines the
government's default status quo point).
In the non-recourse debt contract, the type of technology has a direct impact on the possible
equilibrium outcomes. For projects that involve high switching-cost technologies, the contract
can be Type N-I and type N-II contracts. For projects that involve low switching-cost
technologies, the contract can be Type N-III, Type IV, and Type N-V contracts.
5.2 Future Research Directions
Along the course of this study I unearthed several research problems that deserve further
exploration. Below is a list some that I believe are important for understanding PPP contracting.
(1) The subsidy for financially irrational projects
It is common that countries develop certain public projects for economic reasons versus
financial reasons. A project is financially irrational if the consumer surplus is lower than the
cost to develop the project. It is well recognized that some public projects (i.e. water
treatment) are financially irrational but are critical for economic development. Projects of this
type are typically financed thorough both consumer surplus and government subsidy.
In our model it is assumed that the consumer surplus is always greater than the development
cost of the project. This assumption, together with Assumption 9 (which states that the social
cost of public funds is expensive), removes the possibility for a government subsidy to occur.
By doing so I greatly reduce the number of contract types that a PPP contract can assume.
Certainly the relaxing of the financial rational assumption does not require a big extension
from our existing model. But I believe it will yield important insights into the role of public
funding in PPP contracting.
(2) The relationships among auction, bidding and financial contracting in the PPP realm
It is always of major interest to understand how to design a PPP contract to induce socially
optimal investment. The complete contract literature offers many interesting design
mechanisms to implement first best investment, but they do not to address the out-of-
equilibrium condition where renegotiation can be used to achieve Pareto improvement. This
research establishes the functional relationship between financial contract and agent's effort
incentive but it does not propose a method to design the optimal contract. It will therefore be
of great value to provide a model that either combines the two modeling frameworks, or
explain the relationship between these two issues (i.e. renegotiation and the design of the first
best contract).
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In the real world, as illustrated in chapter 1, the contracting process is often made up of two
stages. In the first stage, a first round public bidding process is used to pre-select or narrow
down the number of potential agents. A second round negotiation is then used to finalize the
contract. The second round contract (which is often made up of incomplete financial
provisions) is often developed based on the common agreements or announcements made in
the first round bidding stage. It is then interesting to see whether this type of two-stage
mechanism is practical in implementing the first best contract, or how to devise a mechanism
to implement the first best contract under this two-stage contracting framework.
(3) The hierarchical agency problem of "tunneling"
Tunneling refers to a phenomenon where an agent ships out money or goods from the
contracted project to an affiliated agent without been detected by the principal. The
hierarchical contractual relationship in PPP projects exhibits substantial opportunities for this
to occur. Tunneling is a possible source of cost overruns, which may lead to default and
renegotiation.
Existing literature on sub-contracting and contract delegation has shed light on relevant issues.
But so far there is no clear answer as for why in most PPP contracts the members of a joint
venture consortium are almost always allowed to be the subcontractors for the executive
entity without being regulated. Understanding such problem is, I believe, critical for
improving the development of PPP contracts.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
We examine the properties of If, I', and R, before analyzing the Pareto frontier. Following
assumption 2, the parties' reinvestments is set equal to the capital shortfall:
If + fx - (e) - 10D
a a
The parties' new investments (If , I' ) therefore satisfy:
a a
I, E IA =[0, x -y(e) - - D
a a
The renegotiated revenue R, should satisfy two conditions (1) the government's payoff with the
renegotiated new contract is greater than her payoff with the new agent:
(18 F(ID 1 H
R, < (+ f) x -VI(e) 10 " )+-1Do _- H
S _a a 18_ ar
and (2) the agent's payoff with the renegotiated new contract is positive:
R1 >- x - q(e) - 1 -Igl 2 Do 2
a[ a a 2#2 )0a2
Let R1 e R [R,,, R,' it is clear that:
R (I+ t) O f -le 0 I D 1 I H
r a a ar
R1,= x - q(e) - L I1 2 82 Do -2
a I a a a
After the properties of If, I'a, and R, are determined, we can now analyze the Pareto frontier of
the renegotiation game:
I 1 a H
max aR (e) + I + D +-
s.t.
v(S -RI) -(1+ 5)Ig = V
Where v is a fixed value belongs to the government's feasibility utility set.
Substituting the objective function with R, = S - (I+ 3)Ig + v], the coefficient of If is
a y
1 - a (1 +,8). It then follows that if - <1+ 5, the agent's utility is maximized by setting If at
y a
the lower bound (If = 0 and therefore I' = x - yi(e) - - D following the new contract's
a a
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budget balance constraint). If >1+ ±, the agent's utility is maximized by setting If at the
a
upper bound (If = x - q'(e) - - - and therefore Ia = 0). Proposition 1 is then proved. o
a a
Proof of Proposition 2:
The government's Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) is:
V1(BATNA) =0 Do ) K o j+
I a a # a
The agent's BATNA is: U1(BATNA) = 0
The government's date 1 net payoff with the new contract is:
Vl(New_ contract) = 7(S - RI)
The agent's date 1 net payoff with the new contract is:
I a H
U(New Contract) = aR - x + yg(e)+- + If+ D +-
-a I a 82 )0a
Solving for the maximization program of the Nash product:
max (Ul (New_ contract) U1(BA 77A) X "(New contract) -V1(BATNA))
Substituting the above program with A, and A2
max - ayR2 + A2D - +-- H R1R, rR, ) a ( a
x-l(e) -5 I - a Do H(1+5) (1 + f-)(x - )(e) - II - DO)+ Do H
The first order condition is:
-2ayR, + Aix-(e)-L +A, 2- 1+/ H =0
a) a ar)
So we have:
, x- e)l A 2 Do-(a + y)H
2ay a 2a2y 2a
Proposition 2 is then proved. o
Proof of Proposition 3:
(1) Definition 1 and definition 3 show that x -x = a(6(1 +,8) y) D - H. By
3 #2A3 A3
assumption 9 we have a(1 +8) > y so A3 > 0 . By assumption a < 6 < y and together with
assumption 9 we have 8(1 +8) > a(1 +) > y so 8(1+8) - y > 0. (1) is then proved.
(2) is derived by equating x, in definition 1 and x 2 in definition 2.
(3) is derived by equating x2 in definition 2 and x3 in definition 3.
Proposition 3 is then proved. o
Proof of Proposition 4:
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Following the decision rule specified in the beginning of this section, the equilibrium scenario
outcomes under each realized cost can be analyzed as follows:
i. If the contract specifies R0 > A 5DO + ) H , the ordering of the2a 2 y
break-even costs is x 2 >x, > x 3 -
(a) If x > x 2 , the government will not take over the project (for x > x 3 ) and the
agent will not self-enforce the contract (for x > x 2 ) so they renegotiate a new
contract.
(a) If x 2 > x > x1 , the government will not take over the project (for x > x3 ) but
the agent will self-enforce the contract (for x < x 2 ). For the agent makes self-
enforcement decision before the parties make the renegotiation decision so the
agent reinforces the contract.
(b) If x < x1 , the project can be completed with the initial capital investment.
ii. If the contract specifies R0 < A5 DO + H , it can be either2a 2  H tabete
A 5DO + H;V >R >A 6 DO + ((1 + l5) H or
2a 27aA3
(i -(1+ +)(1 + f)) H>
aA3
(1) If the contract
(y -a) (1-(1+6)(1+ f))
specifies A5 DO + H>R >A 6 DO ++ H , the ordering of2a 2 y aA3
the break-even costs is x > x2 > x 3 '
(a) If x > x1 , the government will not take over the project (for
x > x 3 ) and the agent will not self-enforce the contract (for x > x 2 ) so they
renegotiate a new contract.
(b) If x < x1 , the project can be completed with the initial capital
investment.
(2) If the contract specifies A6D + (1 + f H > RO, the ordering
aA3
of the break-even costs is x, > x3 > x 2 *
(a) If x > x1 , the government will not take over the project (for
x > x 3 ) and the agent will not self-enforce the contract (for x > x 2 ) so they
renegotiate a new contract.
(b) If x < x1 , the project can be completed with the initial capital
investment.
It turns out that when R0 < A5 DO + 2 H , both
2ay Hy ot
A5D +(y2HR >A 6DO ((1 +)(1+ f))Hand
2a2 aA 3
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A6DO + (I (1 +)(1 + f H > R, yield the same possible scenario outcomes: no
aA3
reinvestment and new contract. Proposition 4 is therefore proved. o
Proof of Proposition 5:
The agent's optimal effort in the Type F-I contract satisfies:
V'(e) = I
where cD I = a (AIF(x2)- A32y
The agent's optimal effort in the Type F-II contract satisfies:
1
VI'(e) =I (D)7
where 1) 7 = a2R -a2A Do +(a+) H f(xi)+ a-(AIF(xi) - A3 )2y 2r
For y(-) is a strictly increasing and concave function. The agent's optimal effort for a Type I
contract is higher than his optimal effort for a Type II contract if 06 > (D7 *
(y - a)HFrom proposition 16 we know that R0 + A D0 - H < 0 for a Type II contract. Also we2a 2;
know F(x2) > F(xl) for a Type I contract so it follows that (D6 > (D7 : given any initial capital
investment r e r , the agent's optimal cost-reducing effort with a Type F-I contract is higher than
his optimal cost-reducing effort with a Type F-II contract. Proposition 5 is then proved. o
Proof of Proposition 6:
_e 8 2 EUFrom comparative statics, the sign of is the same as the sign of 0 and also the sign ofaD0  eD
ae D2 EU
-- is the same as the sign of 4 when there exists a unique solution of optimal e.
aH c8eaH
(1) The effect of debt over the agent's optimal effort:
2 EU(1-i) Type F-I contract: (Type F-1) -
2 A ()'() <0
aeaD 0(1 -ii) Type F-II contract: a2EU(Type F-II) _ - 2 5J (X)l(e
aeFrom (1-i) and (1-ii), the sign of - is strictly negative in both Type F-I and Type F-II
aDO
contracts.
(2) The effect of performance bond over the agent's optimal effort:
(2-i) Type F-I contract: a2EUO(Type F-I) - (a + ) 2
aeaH 27
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(2-ii) Type F-IL contract: a 2 EU(Type F-I) (a + y)
aeaH 2 f
From (2-i) and (2-ii), the sign of -- is strictly positive in both Type F-I and Type F-II contracts.
aH
Combing (1) and (2) we know for any given initial capital investment 7r e 7r, the agent's optimal
cost-reducing effort decreases with the level of debt, and increases with the level of the
performance bond in both Type F-I and Type F-II contracts. Proposition 6 is then proved. o
Proof of Proposition 7:
H H
We know that (1) R0 - is the government's BATNA revenue (i.e. R0 - - is the upper
ay ay
bound of the agent's renegotiated revenue), and (2) under assumption 9 the government's
reinvestment If is 0 after renegotiation. For every payment P the agent pays to the bank to retain
the ownership of the project
p (1+ f)I0 DO S +_ )I(P E [- RO - (x - y(e) )-S- (x - y(e) - LO ]) the agent's ex
a a a a a a a a
post renegotiation payoff aR1 - x ± y(e)+ + _ aP is strictly smaller then his non-
a a
I D0
renegotiation payoff aRO - x + yf(e) + 4 + - aP. Therefore the agent will not renegotiate
a a
with the government over (Ia ,If , R).
The complete proof is shown as follows: We first examine the properties of If, I', and
R, before analyzing the Pareto frontier. Following assumption 1, the parties' reinvestments is set
equal to the capital shortfall:
If+I' =x-(e)- -
a a
The parties' new investments (If, I') therefore satisfy:
I E- IGD
a a
I, e IA =[0, x - V(e) - - D]
a a
Let P e [-RO - ( x - V(e) - ),-S - (x - y'(e) - 1 - D)] be the fee that
a a a a a a a a
the agent pays to the bank to retain the ownership of the project.9 The renegotiated revenue R,
should satisfy two conditions (1) the government's payoff with the renegotiated new contract is
greater than her payoff with the new agent scenario outcome:
Ig HRi ! RO -(1+ )
y ay
and (2) the agent's payoff with the renegotiated new contract is non-negative:
9 fR 0 -(1 + f)(x - yi(e) - I - D- is the bank's payoff for turning down the agent's offer.
a a -)
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R > I x -y(e) -I f _D pIa( a a a2
Let R, e R = [R,, R1 *], it is clear that:
.1 =? (l+3)j HRi = RO )1 - I 
7 ay
R = x --xy/(e) - I + -2a a a a
After the properties of If , I'", and Ri are determined, we can now analyze the Pareto frontier of
the renegotiation game:
max aR, -x+yf(e)+L +I9 + Do-aP+-
s.t.
y(S-R 1)-(l+3)If = V
Where v is a fixed value belongs to the government's feasibility utility set.
Substituting the objective function with R, = S - [(I+ 3)If + v], the coefficient of i1 is
1 (1+ 3). By assumption 9 we have - <1+3 so the agent's utility is maximized If is set atY a
the lower bound (If = 0 and therefore I" = x - y/(e) - D0 - R)
a a
The Pareto frontier of the renegotiation game is a straight line with the government and the agent
bargaining over Ri e [R I R1, ]. Since the bargaining game is a Nash bargaining game, R can be
determined as follows:
The agent's BATNA is: U1(BATNA) = 0
The government's BATNA is:
V(BA TNA) = y(S - RO +H
a
The agent's date 1 net payoff with the new contract is:
U(New Contract) =aRl -x + y/(e)+ ap + H
a a a
The government's date 1 net payoff with the new contract is:
V1(New -contract) = y(S- RO)
Solving for the maximization program of the Nash product:
max (Ul (New_ contract) -U(BATNA) X V(New contract) -V(BATNA)
The first order condition is:
2aR, - [aRO + aP +(x - ql(e) - ) - =D) 0
a a y
So we have:
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R, =[R, +P+ I x- y/(e) 10 -Do ) a+)H]
2 _ a a a ) ay _
Substituting Ul(New_ contract) with R,, the agent's date 1 payoff after renegotiation with the
government is:
U1(New contract) a(RO - P)- x + yf/(e) + L' + Do +1 (a-) H2( a a ) ar
The agent's date 1 payoff without renegotiation with the government is 10 :
-~R P)-~qie)± +D aH
UI(NRG) = a(RO - 0)~ x+ yf(e)+I1 +Do +- - UI(New contract)2
The agent's payoff with the new contract is smaller than the agent's payoff with the existing
payoff so the agent will not renegotiate with the government over (Ia,If , RI). Proposition 7 is
then proved. o
Proof of Proposition 8:
(1) The renegotiated fee P should satisfy two conditions: (i) the agent's payoff with the new
contract is greater than his payoff with no agreement:
P !; R0  x - y/(e) " + 20a a a a2
and (ii) the bank's payoff with the new contract is greater than his payoff with the new agent:
P R0 1 1f )IDoP Ro - +fx - yl(e)
The necessary and sufficient condition for a feasible P to exist is for the upper bound of P to
be greater or equal to the lower bound of P:
~a(1+ f) -/3Io DjHa~l+ ) ,8 x - y/(e) 1 Do+- H >0
a,8 a a a2
( - 1 H
(2) If .A+ -ie -Jo - D) )-- 0 holds, the agent's payment to the bank P must
satisfy:
P C P [P. , P*]
F 1+ ±f (Io D0  1 I( D0 Hi
= R- ix - yV(e) ,- R I x - (e) D +0 8 a a 0 a( a a a _
Given the assumption that the bargaining game is a Nash bargaining game, P can be
determined as follows:
The agent's BATNA is:
UI(BATAA) = 0
The bank's BATNA is:
W1 (BA TNA) = 8RO -(1+ f)x - (e) a
The agent's date 1 net payoff with the new contract is:
10 For the agent to reinvest, it must be that U(NRG) 0
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Ul(New Contract) = a(RO - P)- x + yI(e) + 1(I +Do + H)
a
The bank's date 1 net payoff with the new contract is:
W1 (New_ Contract) =8P
Solving for the maximization program of the Nash product:
max (Ul (New contract) U1( BATNA) XW1 (New contract) - W'(BATNA)
The first order condition is:
2afPf-2apR +(8+a(1+f))(x - q(e) - I0 - Do)- "= 0
a
So we have:
P=R- #+a(l+f) (x - AI(e)-I1 -Do)+2ap 2a
Proposition 8 is then proved. o
Proof of Proposition 9:
(1) Calculate xi - x 3 directly:
x1 - x 3 = H
2a(aA7 -1)
Because aA7 -1= -l -a1) , it follows that x, > x3 if - s +f, and x, < X3 if2 )6
->l+f.
a
(2) is derived by equating definition 1 with definition 2.
(3) is derived by equating definition 2 with definition 3.
Proposition 21 is then proved. o
Proof of Proposition 10:
Following the decision rule specified in the beginning of this section, the equilibrium scenario
outcomes under each realized cost can be analyzed as follows:
(a) If the project exhibits - < 1+ f:
a
D H(i) If the contract specifies R0 > - --- , the ordering of the break-even costs isp 2a 2
x 2 > x1 *
a. If x > x2,the bank will want to renegotiate a new contract (for - <1+ f
a
and x > x3 ) and the agent will not self-enforce the contract (for x > x 2 ) so
they renegotiate a new contract.
b. If x 2 > x > x1 , the bank will want to renegotiate a new contract (for
-9<1+ f and x> x3 ) but the agent will self-enforce the contract (for
a
x < x2 ). Because the agent makes self-enforcement decision before the
parties make the renegotiation decision so the agent self-enforces the
contract.
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c. If x < x1 , the project can be completed with the initial capital investment
so no reinvestment is needed.
(ii) If the contract specifies R0 < -_ , the ordering of the break-even costs is
x 2 < x1 -
a. If x > x1, the bank will want to renegotiate a new contract (for - <1 +f
and x > x3 ) and the agent will not self-enforce the contract (for x > x2 ) so
they renegotiate a new contract.
b. If x < x, the project can be completed with the initial capital investment
so no reinvestment is needed.
(b) If the project exhibits P > 1 + f:
a
(i) If the contract specifies R > + ( , the ordering of the break-even
p 2  2a 2 (1 - aA7 )
costs is x 2 > x3 > x 1 *
a. If x > x 2 , the bank will want to take over the project (for
- >1+ f and x> x3 ) and the agent will not self-enforce the old contract
a
(for x > x 2 ) so the bank brings in a new agent to complete the project.
b. If x 2 > x > x1 , the bank may want to take over the project (when
x3 < x < x 2 ) or renegotiate a new contract (when x, < x < x3 ). But the
agent will self-enforce the contract (for x < x 2 ). Because the agent makes
self-enforcement decision before the bank makes the take-over decision so
the agent self-enforces the contract.
c. If x < x 1 , the project can be completed with the initial capital
investment so no reinvestment is needed.
D0  H D0  (1 -2aX 7 )H(ii) If the contract specifies -<R < D ( , the ordering of the
P2 2a2 2 2 ah2e(1d-gaA7)h
break-even costs is x 3 > x2 > x 1 I
a. If x > x 3 , the bank will want to take over the project (for for - >1+ f
a
and x > x3 ) and the agent will not self-enforce the contract (for x > x 2 ) so
the bank brings in a new agent to complete the project.
b. If x 2 <x < x3 , the bank will want to renegotiate a new contract (for
->1+ f and x < x3 ) and the agent will not self-enforce the old contract
a
(for x > x 2 ) so they renegotiate a new contract.
c. If x1 < x < x2 , the bank will want to renegotiate a new contract (for for
- >1+ f and x < x3 ) but the agent will want to self-enforce the contract
a
(for x < x2 ). Because the agent makes self-enforcement decision before
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the bank makes the take-over decision so the agent self-enforces the
contract.
d. If x < x 1 , the project can be completed with the initial capital
investment so no reinvestment is needed.
D0 H(iii) If the contract specifies R0 < R - H , the ordering of the break-even costs is
x3 > xi > x2 *
a. If x > x 3 , the bank will want to take over the project (for - >1+ f and
a
x > x 3 ) and the agent will not self-enforce the old contract (for x > x 2 ) so
the bank brings in a new agent to complete the project.
b. If x 3 > x > x 1 , the bank will want to renegotiate a new contract (for x < x3 )
and the agent will not self-enforce the old contract (for x > x 2 ) so they
renegotiate a new contract.
c. If x < x 1 , the project can be completed with the initial capital investment
so no reinvestment is needed.
Proposition 10 is therefore proved. o
Proof of Proposition 11:
The agent's optimal effort in the Type N-I contract satisfies:
1
Vl'(e) =I
where 03 = a(1- aA7 (1- F(x2 )
The agent's optimal effort in the Type N-II contract satisfies:
1
V'(e) =
014
where (14 = a(1-aA(1-F(x,)))+ a2R - D +
4 0 aA 0 2p 2 ,f(I
For O(-) is a strictly increasing and concave function. The agent's optimal effort for a Type N-I
contract is higher than his optimal effort for a Type N-1I contract if 03 > (D4.
1 HFrom proposition 10 we know that RO 2 Do + 2 < 0 for a Type N-II contract. Also we
p 2a
know F(x2 ) > F(xl) for a Type N-I contract so it follows that D8 > 09: given any initial capital
investment;r e r, the agent's optimal cost-reducing effort with a Type N-I contract is higher than
his optimal cost-reducing effort with a Type N-Il contract. Proposition 11 is then proved. o
Proof of Proposition 12:
The agent's optimal effort in the Type N-III contract satisfies:
l'(e) =I
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wher f1) =a~x 3 )a22 (1 -+~2aA7) f)where (D = aF(x3)+ 2 RO 2 Do + (- a7)H f (X,)5 3) ( p2 2(1 - aA7)
The agent's optimal effort in the Type N-IV contract satisfies:
1
y'(e) =
where (D6 = aF(x3)+ a 2A 7 (F(x2 )- F(x3 ))
The agent's optimal effort in the Type N-V contract satisfies:
1
y'(e) = (D)7
wheR a2 D+(I - 2aA7)
where (D7 = aF(X3) +a 2A(F(xi) - F(x3))+ 0 2R P 2 D0 +( H a7 f(xl)
For /(-) is a strictly increasing and concave function. The agent's optimal effort has the ordering
e~ye * J > * if (1) > (D> D
Te N -111 Type N-IV Type N-V 5 6 7*
D (1-2aA )H
From proposition 10 we know that R0 > Do (1 for a Type N-III contract andp 2a 2(1 - aA7 )
D0 HR0 <DO - --H for a Type N-IV contract. Also we know F(x2 ) < F(x3 ) for Type N-IV and N-
V contracts so it follows that 1D5 > (D > cD7 : given any initial capital investment rr e 7r, the order
of the agent's optimal effort is e*y >- e * pe . Proposition 12 is then proved. oType N -Ill eType N-IV >TypeNv
Proof of Proposition 13:
Be a2 EU
From comparative statics, the sign of - is the same as the sign of 0 and also the sign of
aD0  eD 0
Be 82EU
- is the same as the sign of 0 when there exists a unique solution of optimal e.
Uri aeaH
(1) The effect of debt over the agent's optimal effort:
82EU 2
(1-i) Type N-I contract: a 2 EUO(Type N-1) 2x
aeaD 2
(1-ii) Type N-II contract: a 2 EUO(Type N-II) a 2
aeaDO p <
82EU 2
(1-iii) Type N-III contract: (Type N-) 2 f()() <0
82EU 2
(1-iv) Type N-IV contract: a 2 EUO(TypeN-IV) _ 2
-eo f(X 2 )'(e) <0
82EU 2
(1-v) Type N-V contract: aeaD0  - 2 f (X1 )y/(e) < 0
ae
As above, the sign of -- is strictly positive in all non-recourse debt contracts.
aDO
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(2) The effect of performance bond over the agent's optimal effort:
a2 EU(Tp N-)(2-i) Type N-I contract: =(Type N-I) 1 2
ae8H 2
a2 EUO (Tp -1(2-ii) Type N-II contract: - E -(Type N-I) 1
8eOH 2
(2-iii) Type N-III contract:
82 EUO(TN IV)(2-iv) Type N-IV contract: =(yp - 2 ± > 08e&H 2
82 EU(YeV Lf()fx4"e
(2-v) Type N-V contract: (Type N-V) 3 > 0
aeaH 2
From (1), (2) and (3), the sign of -- is strictly positive in Type N-I, Type N-II and Type8H
N-IV, and Type V contracts.
Combing (1) and (2) we know for any given initial capital investment ;r e ;, the agent's optimal
cost-reducing effort decreases with the level of debt, and increases with the level of the
performance bond in all non-recourse debt contracts. Proposition 13 is then proved. o
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